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(Sgd.) *HP*

Date *22/4/76*

CONFIDENTIAL

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.  
or POST

MIDDLE EAST

FILE No. *NBR 25/548/1* (Part *A*)

TITLE: *RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS*

*BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ*

REFER TO

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NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
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*Registry*  
*G.S.B.*

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*5/2*

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*43*

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*21/3*

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*49*

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*PKW*

*Reg*

*51*

*27/3*

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*TC*

*53*

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*M. Wright*

*53*

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*BU 16.4.73*

*Reg*

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*8/4*

*G.S.B.*

*R*

*BU PKW*

*53*

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*G.S.B.*

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*22/2*

*R*

*PKW*

*41*

*28/2*

*Reg*

*5/3*

Registry Address

Room No. *W 92*  
Downing Street (W)

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1974



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FM BAGHDAD 020840Z JAN.


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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 003 OF 002 JANUARY 1974.

ROUTINE CAIRO

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.



EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR NAJJAR TOOK ME ASIDE EARLY ON NEW YEARS EVE TO MAKE A PLEA FOR UK TO BE LESS TIMID IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. HE RECOMMENDED THAT WE GET A PRO-ARAB MP OR TWO TO VISIT BAGHDAD FORTHWITH. (US SENATOR ABU RISAQ IS COMING THIS WEEKEND).

2. IN FAVOUR OF EARLY RESUMPTION HE REPEATED THE FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS :-

(A) RELATIONS WITH IRAN HAVE BEEN RESUMED

(B) BRITAIN HAS BEEN DESIGNATED A "FRIENDLY COUNTRY."

FURTHER (C) THE IRAQIS ARE BEREFT OF IDEAS, AND CAN NOT BE EXPECTED TO THINK UP FOR THEMSELVES WAYS OF ENGINEERING A RESUMPTION WITH UK.

3. I THANKED HIM FOR HIS ADVISE BUT SAID IRAQ WAS CAPABLE OF INITIATIVES IN OTHER FIELDS AND I COULD NOT SEE WHAT HELD HER BACK HERE. MEN LIKE HAMMADI AND GHAI DAN HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNINTY TO TAKE A FIRST STEP IF THEY SO WISHED.

4. NAJJAR IS FRIENDLY AND INTELLIGENT, WITH 2 YEARS SERVICE IN BAGHDAD. HE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT WISH TO ENTER INTO A DISCUSSION WHICH WOULD DILUTE HIS ORIGINAL ARGUEMENT. I THEREFORE SUSPECT HE MAY HAVE SPOKEN ON ADVICE FROM IRAQIS OR CAIRO.

MCCLUNEY

FILES  
MED  
NENAD  
PUSD  
IRD  
NEWS DEPT  
MR LE QUESNE  
MR PARSONS

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**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
-8 JAN 1974

NBR 25/548/1.

I McCluney Esq  
British Interests Section  
Royal Swedish Embassy  
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

Date 4 January 1974

25/548/1  
pa

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

1 Thank you for your telegram no. 3 reporting your conversation with the Egyptian Ambassador and his advice on steps we could take to improve relations with Iraq.

There is probably some sense in his advice about getting a pro-Arab MP to visit Baghdad and we would certainly want to look at this seriously when a suitable candidate is available. Unfortunately, your suggestion arrived too late to be taken into account in planning the current visit to the Middle East by Mr Christopher Mayhew MP. On the main question of the resumption of relations, however, we think that the two most likely indicators of the present climate will be the promised private visit of Sa'adoun Ghaidan and the Iraqi response to the COMET request for a Trade Mission visit. On the latter, we would be grateful for early news of how matters stand with the Iraqis and for anything you can do to hasten a reply. Time to set up the Mission is now beginning to be short.


P K Williams.  
Middle East Department

cc: Chancery, Cairo

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Mr Wright MED



The point by Mr  
Mr. C. de Communes is  
Mr. L. 8/1, v. curious.  
Mr. B. 8/1  
pu

ANGLO/FRENCH TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST: IRAQ

1. You asked me to ensure that Mr Parsons raised the question of our relations with Iraq at the Anglo/French talks on 4 January. I did.

2. You might like to know in advance of the full record that the French said that instructions had been sent to their Ambassador in Baghdad to take the first "good occasion" to make soundings of the Iraqis without attributing them to us. The French expected their Ambassador to act "quite soon". Their Ambassador's impression was that the Iraqis wanted to renew. Mr Parsons said that this was no doubt true to but they wanted us to make a gesture while at the same time not knowing what this gesture should be. M. de Communes asked, curiously in my view, whether the gesture they wanted could have anything to do with the Kurdish problem.

Mr Parsons said not. What they probably wanted of us was to be the demandeur.

D A Gore-Booth  
Near East & North  
Africa Department

7 January 1974

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OBJET: RELATIONS ANGLO-IRAKIENNES.

NBR 25/548/1

iss 2/1

JE ME REFERE A VOTRE TELEGRAMME 382.

J'AI SAISI HIER L'OCCASION D'UN ENTRETIEN AVEC LE SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES POUR L'INTERROGER SUR LES INTENTIONS DE SON GOUVERNEMENT AU SUJET D'UNE EVENTUELLE REPRISE DES RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES AVEC LONDRES.

J'AI APPELE A NOUVEAU L'ATTENTION DE MON INTERLOCUTEUR SUR L'IMPORTANCE DE L'INFLECHISSEMENT DE LA POLITIQUE BRITANNIQUE EN FAVEUR DE L'ARABISME. J'AI FAIT VALOIR QUE LE CHANGEMENT D'ATTITUDE DE WHITEHALL DANS LE DOMAINE PETROLIER ET DANS L'AFFAIRE PALESTINIENNE ATTESTAIT D'UNE MANIERE INDENIABLE SON SOUCI DE TENIR PLEINEMENT COMPTE DES INTERETS ARADES. COMME M. TAQA ACCEPTAIT CES PREMISSES, JE LUI AI DEMANDE SI SON GOUVERNEMENT N'ESTIMAIT PAS LE MOMENT VENU D'EN TIRER LES CONSEQUENCES SUR LE PLAN DIPLOMATIQUE.

DE LA REPONSE DU SECRETAIRE D'ETAT, JE RETIENS LES POINTS SUIVANTS: 1) CERTES, DIT-IL, LA RUPTURE DES RELATIONS ANGLO-IRAKIENNES A RESULTE, COMME CELLE DES RELATIONS IRAKO-IRANIENNES, DE "LA COLLUSION" FORMEE EN 1971 ENTRE LONDRES ET TEHERAN AU

PAGE DEUX

SUJET DES ILES DU DETROIT D'ORMUZ. MAIS LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE NE DISPOSE PAS ICI DES MEMES ATOUTS GEOGRAPHIQUES QUE L'IRAN. AUSSI BIEN LES AUTORITES IRAKIENNES N'ONT-ELLES NULLEMENT L'INTENTION DE REEDITER A SON PROFIT LE GESTE EFFECTUE A L'AUTOMNE DERNIER EN FAVEUR DU CHAH SOUS LA PRESSION DES IMPERATIFS MILITAIRES.

2) AU CONTRAIRE, BAGDAD ESTIME TOUJOURS QU'IL APPARTIENT A LONDRES DE FAIRE LE PREMIER PAS. SI WHITEHALL PREND UNE INITIATIVE DANS CE SENS, IL NE SE HEURTERA CERTAINEMENT PAS A UNE FIN DE NONRECEVOIR ET LE DIALOGUE SE NOUERA AUSSITOT. TOUT EN SE DEFENDANT DE POSER DES CONDITIONS, LE GOUVERNEMENT IRAKIEN ENTEND CEPENDANT FAIRE VALOIR, AVANT LE RETABLISSEMENT DES RELATIONS NORMALES, UN CERTAIN NOMBRE DE "CONSIDERATIONS": IL CHERCHERAIT TOUT PARTICULIEREMENT A OBTENIR DES "PREUVES CONCRETES" DE LA VOLONTE DE L'ANGLETERRE DE SE COMPORTER ICI EN PUISSANCE EUROPEENNE MENANT SANS EQUIVOQUE UNE POLITIQUE D'INDEPENDANCE "NATIONALE".



OBJET: RELATIONS ANGLO-IRAKIENNES.

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
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ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY  
British Interests Section  
BAGHDAD



G.S. Burton Esq.,  
Middle East Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London.

Your reference

copied at NBR 25/548/1

Date 15 January 1974

Dear Graham

Which are Iraqs "friendly" countries?

In Baghdad the term friendly has been traditionally associated with the Eastern Bloc countries. They are the friends; the Arabs are brothers, and the rest are imperialists or undefined.

2. Since the war and the oil cutbacks the term "friendly countries" has taken a new meaning. Iraq has been careful in its definitions to be none too precise about who is friendly and who is not. During the war Western Europe was "neutral", and gradually became "friendly", by comparison with USA. When the friendly countries were listed by Arab Foreign Ministers, as a group or individually, Iraq did not disagree, but simply kept her council.

3. Among Western European countries, Iraq hailed France as having the right attitude, but no other European country has been specifically mentioned. As far as I can trace, the nearest the Iraqis have come to naming friendly countries is the interview with "Al Anwar" of Beirut when Hammadi said...

"Iraq is now shouldering the task of solving the problems which friendly countries face because of the cutback by supplying them with national sector oil. Numerous delegations from friendly countries have arrived in Baghdad for discussion and negotiations. Delegations from Spain, Austria, Brazil, Poland, Tanzania, Pakistan, India and Bulgaria have come to us. All these countries are friendly and have stood at our side; but, despite this, they are now suffering a dangerous crisis. Iraq is trying as far as its limited capacity permits to solve their energy shortage problems."


4. Though I missed it at the time, I should also record the editorial of the Baghdad Observer of 22 December. It said Iraq "has always been prepared to strike at foreign interests when any sign of aggression against the Arab Nation is shown by any state. With the nationalisation of PARTEX the only foreign shares remaining in BPC are those shares held by pro-Arab countries." This is the only time I have seen Britain called pro-Arab in the government press, even indirectly.

Yours ever,  
Ian

(I. McCluney)



CONFIDENTIAL



Mr Weir

Mr. Wright

*Mr. Bryan*  
*5.2.73*  
*hr spmr.*  
*7/2*  
*1/2*

POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

- A 1 In Mr Wright's minute of 16 November, he recommended that we should await the outcome of the visit of General Ghaidan, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, before considering any further the question of a resumption. In the event, General Ghaidan's visit was delayed and he is not now expected to arrive here until later this month. Mr Hunt, while in Baghdad in early December, took the opportunity to ask the French Ambassador to take a further sounding of the Iraqis on our behalf without, of course, revealing that we were behind it (he last did this in May 1973).
- B
- C 2 The French Embassy here have now passed us a copy of a telegram from the French Ambassador in Baghdad reporting the results of his action with the Iraqis. He spoke again to Shadhil Taqa, the Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who maintained his consistently rigid line. The only new note is sounded in the last sentence which appears to be a hint that we should do more to divorce ourselves from the Americans and "adopt a wholly European stance" (whatever that means).
- 3 Clearly, the Iraqis still regard a positive gesture from us as a pre-requisite to any negotiation on a resumption. In view of the Minister of State's instruction that there can be no question at this stage of any direct or indirect request by us to the Iraqis, I submit that we should take no further action for the time being.

/We may



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We may gain more information from General Ghaidan if and when he comes: failing this, I suggest we should review the matter again in two months' time in the light of general developments in the Middle East.



T J Clark  
Middle East Department

18 January 1974

1. I am afraid this got buried. I agree with the recommendation, but we now of course have the forthcoming COMET mission to Iraq as a convenient vehicle through which to pursue the question if we wish. We shall need to consider how to brief Sir R Beaumont nearer the time.

2. I meant to record earlier that shortly before I left New York Talib Shibib, the Arab League Representative in the United States, previously Iraqi Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Arab League representative in London, and earlier still Foreign Minister, took me aside at a dinner to which I had invited him to discuss the possible resumption of relations. He hinted that he had had indications from the highest levels in the Iraqi Government that they were positively interested in a resumption and that all that was necessary was to agree on the modalities.

/Needless

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Needless to say he said that the first move should come from our side, on which I said that my personal reaction was that British Ministers were unlikely to feel the same way. He added that he might well be appointed Ambassador to London himself. While I think Shibib would be an admirable Ambassador from our point of view, this evident element of self interest makes me doubtful whether we can place much reliance on his claim to be reflecting official views, but it might be a straw in the wind. He knew, for example, about the impending visit of General Ghaidan. He also said that Ambassador Dimechkié was active in the matter - I do not know whether there is any truth in this.

3. Shibib asked if I could send some word back to him via Sir D Maitland. While we would not want to treat him as an intermediary, it would do no harm to let him know about the COMET mission when arrangements for it are complete; if you agree, I might drop a line to Sir D Maitland.

*M S Weir*

M S Weir

31 January 1974

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Mr. B. 11/2  
pa

pe + p =

Mr. Weir o.r. *Mr. 11/2*

## POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

In your minute of 31 January you recorded a conversation with Talib Shabib about our relations with Iraq and mentioned in particular the activities of the Lebanese Ambassador in London.

2. The Lebanese Ambassador spoke to the Permanent Under-Secretary about six months ago about our relations with Iraq and suggested then that some leading Iraqi personalities might be coming to London who would wish to get in touch with us. Nothing came of this, although we did later have conversations (unconnected with the Lebanese Ambassador's approach) with the Iraqi Minister of the Interior who was here for medical treatment. The Lebanese Ambassador has, however, recently told Mr. Craig that the Iraqis appear to be giving active consideration to the selection of their Ambassador to London when relations are resumed and I understand that M. Dimechkié has mentioned Talib Shabib as a possible candidate for this. This should not perhaps be regarded as collateral for Shabib's account given to you, since I suspect that Shabib may have described himself to the Lebanese Ambassador as a potential candidate for the Embassy here.

3. As you know, the Iraqis have now accepted the COMET Mission which will be led by Lord Denman and will be in Iraq from 23-25 February. Although I see no particular harm in your suggestion that you might let Shabib know about the Mission, I would on balance advise against this. I still see some attraction in presenting the Mission before and during the event as a straight commercial exercise, but in keeping our options open for presenting it after the event as a gesture to the Iraqi Government (when they ask for one).

4. I should also record that the Lebanese Ambassador told Mr. Craig that Abdul Wahab Kayyali, a member of the Ba'ath national leadership, has recently been in London under an assumed name. Mr. Dimechkié obscurely attached importance to this as a sign of Iraqi interest in developing relations with us.

P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department

5 February 1974

Copy to: Mr. Craig, NENAD

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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
18 FEB 1974  
NBR 25/548/1

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Mr. Le Quesne

Copy to: Mr. Burton  
Chancery, Paris.


UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

When M. Lafon of the French Embassy called on me this afternoon to give me an account of M. Jobert's visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait he mentioned that his Foreign Minister would be in Baghdad for the next three days and remarked that the French Ambassador in Baghdad had commented on various signs that the Iraqi attitude to HMG was improving. He mentioned in particular the visit of General Ghaidan; the forthcoming COMET Mission; and the visit of Professor Bakr to London.

2. I told M. Lafon that General Ghaidan's second visit, which we had expected in December and then in January, had not in fact yet materialised, possibly because of the re-shuffle in the Iraqi leadership. So far as the COMET Mission was concerned, I emphasised that this was a purely commercial exercise which had been taken at our initiative. I did not think that it therefore added much evidence to Iraqi attitudes towards us. For M. Lafon's own information, I told him that Iraqi agreement to the Mission had in fact taken some time to come. So far as Professor Bakr's visit was concerned, this was, so far as I knew, related to medical exchanges which had continued uninterrupted during the break in relations.

3. I told M. Lafon that I hoped nevertheless that an opportunity would be taken during M. Jobert's visit to sound the Iraqis on the possibility of a resumption of diplomatic relations with HMG. I emphasised that we would not wish any such soundings to be made explicitly on our behalf, but we would welcome any indications which arose during M. Jobert's visit. If the Iraqis argued that some "gesture" was required of HMG (e.g. in the guise of an improved stance towards the Arabs) I hoped that M. Jobert would feel able to point to the appreciation expressed by a number of Arab States for HMG's policy and to the leading part which we and the French had played in bringing about the European Declaration in early November. M. Lafon said that he would certainly telegraph in this sense in time for M. Jobert's visit.

4. Since my conversation with M. Lafon we have heard that the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Paris has asked to call on H.M. Ambassador. This may be quite unrelated to general political matters and we will no doubt get an account shortly of whatever it is the Chargé d'Affaires wishes to raise. It may be related to some outstanding visa questions.

  
P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department



6 February 1974



9.

GR 70


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FM BAGHDAD 070930Z

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 33 OF 7 FEBRUARY/ INFO ROUTINE TO  
VISFO.

VISIT OF IRAQ FOREIGN MINISTER.

S D MURTADHA SAID ABDUL BAQI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
AND HIS WIFE MRS RAGHIBA DAOUD ALANI INTEND PRIVATE VISIT  
TO BRITAIN.

WE UNDERSTAND MRS AL ANI MAY HAVE MEDICAL CHECK UP.

SHE WENT FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT EARLY 1973 (VAF 16).

NO DATE HAS YET BEEN FIXED BUT MFA HAVE PROMISED TO LET US  
KNOW DETAILS.

2. WE HAVE ISSUED VISAS IN CIRCUMSTANCES.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

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P & CD


MR WEIR

*Handwritten signature/initials*



IMMEDIATE  
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CPS 200  
FM PARIS 081540Z

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 179 OF 08 FEBRUARY. 1974

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

1. THE IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING AT HIS REQUEST. HE SEEMED TO BE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT I HAD BEEN PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SOUNDINGS CONCERNING THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AND HE PROFESSED TO BE HONOURED TO BE ENTRUSTED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF RESPONDING. HE THEN READ ME A MESSAGE WHICH SAID: QUOTE THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IS READY TO RECEIVE A DELEGATION PRESIDED BY A MINISTER WHO IS AUTHORISED TO DISCUSS THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD INCLUDE ECONOMISTS AUTHORISED TO NEGOTIATE AND AGREE ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF H M G TO THE BUILD-UP (SIC) OF BASIC AND VITAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, ON THE LINES OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAQ AND JAPAN UNQUOTE. THE DATE SUGGESTED AS MOST CONVENIENT WAS TOWARDS THE END OF FEBRUARY.

2. I TOLD MR WALI THAT IT SEEMED MOST IMPROBABLE THAT A MINISTER WOULD BE ABLE TO GO TO IRAQ IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IMMEDIATE REPLY. MR WALI CLEARLY EXPECTS OUR REPLY TO BE CONVEYED THROUGH HIM.

TOMKINS

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MR FCO

RR WASHINGTON

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FM BAGHDAD 110600Z

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ADVANCE COPY

(11)

Mr. BURTONEnte Sampton & Lablans  
file  
4B 1/2  
pa

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 38 OF 11 FEBRUARY INFO ROUTINE  
WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

DIRECTOR WESTERN DEPARTMENT MFA MADE A SPECIAL POINT OF  
SAYING 8 FEB THAT IRAQ HOPED BRITAIN AT THE WASHINGTON  
CONFERENCE WOULD FOLLOW THE FRENCH LINE.

2. HE REPEATED GENERAL POINTS ABOUT THE CONFERENCE IN  
BAKRS LETTER TO NIXON AND ALSO SAID THAT TO HAVE USA AS  
ORCHESTRATOR AND HOST WAS PSCHYCOLOGICALLY WRONG.  
SHE WAS A PARTICIPANT IN THE ME WAR, BOYCOTTED FOR OIL  
SUPPLIES, AND A KNOWN OPPONENT OF THE ARAB CAUSE.  
BRITAIN HE HOPED WOULD EXERT A MODERATING INFLUENCE IN  
WASHINGTON AS WE HAD IN EUROPE LAST YEAR.

3. I MADE THE OBVIOUS COMMENT THAT WE WELCOMED THE US  
INITIATIVE AND THEIR VITAL ROLE IN ME PEACE AND  
OIL MATTERS COULD NOT BE DENIED. I SAID IT WOULD BE EASIER  
FOR IRAQ TO GET HER POINTS ACROSS IF OUR RELATIONS WERE  
BETTER. HE REPLIED THAT IRAQ WOULD BE WATCHING OUR  
ATTITUDE IN WASHINGTON.

MCCLUNEY



Mr. Weir

UK/IRAQI RELATIONS

Problem

CONFIDENTIAL

The Iraqis have proposed via their Chargé d'Affaires in

Flag A Paris that a delegation led by a Minister should visit Baghdad to discuss the resumption of diplomatic relations. They have also asked that the delegation should include "economists" authorised to negotiate an agreement on the lines of the recent Iraqi/Japanese agreement. In parallel the French Foreign Minister was told

Flag B by Saddam Hussein, Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, during his current visit to Baghdad, that it was important that diplomatic relations with HMG should be established in the near future. How should we respond?

#### Background

2. The Iraqi Government broke diplomatic relations with us in December 1971 on the grounds that HMG had been guilty of "collusion" with Iran in the seizure of the Tunbs and Abu Musa. We have since then retained an Interests Section under the Swedish flag.

3. Commercial and economic relations have continued and the level of our current exports to Iraq stands at about £30 million. Our major interests in Iraq are to develop these commercial relations and in particular to ensure that we continue to receive Iraqi oil (of which there may be considerable unproven reserves).

4. Plans have already been made for a mission under Lord Denman, Chairman of the Council for Middle East Trade (COMET) to visit Baghdad between 22 and 25 February. The mission as at present

/constituted

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we discussed

MacLeland

N Wright  
MED

Mr. Bryant

15/2/74  
pc

I don't put in why (12)  
Lord Denman should not  
go so long as the decision is 35

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRATION 35  
12 FEB 1974  
NBB 25/28/

Secretary of State  
on resuming relations is not taken  
until after the election. But it is  
perhaps better to take the excuse -



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constituted will include Sir Richard Beaumont of the Middle East Association (and a former Ambassador to Iraq) together with one or two other senior industrialists.

Flag B 5. The French Ambassador told the Permanent Under-Secretary today that he had received a message from his Foreign Minister in Baghdad to say that Saddam Hussein, the Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, had indicated that Iraq wished to maintain the dialogue between Europe and the Arabs and that he thought it was important that diplomatic relations should be established between London and Baghdad "in the near future".

Flag A Simultaneously, H.M. Ambassador in Paris has reported an approach by the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires to the effect that his Government were interested in discussing a resumption of relations and that they proposed that a delegation headed by a Minister should be sent to Baghdad which would also include economic experts authorised to negotiate an agreement on the contribution of HMG to "basic and vital" development projects on the lines of the agreement between Iraq and Japan.

Flag C 6. The agreement signed between the Japanese Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry and his Iraqi opposite number on 17 January is set out in Baghdad telegram No. 18. The agreement provides for a Japanese loan of \$1000 million for use towards petroleum and allied industrial development against the supply of oil and petroleum products.

Argument

7. Since the break in diplomatic relations in 1971, we have consistently taken the view that it was for the Iraqis to make  
/the

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the first move towards a resumption. Even though their present approach contains a request for a ministerial visit (which in present domestic circumstances would clearly be impossible) and proposes the negotiation of a Japanese-type agreement (involving not only a loan but also the type of barter oil deal which we are anxious to avoid at present) I believe that it would be right to respond quickly and positively to what can be presented as an Iraqi request for a resumption. EV

8. A resumption of relations with Iraq per se should cause us no problems in terms of external relations provided appropriate explanations are given to the Kuwaitis and Iranians in particular (and also of course to the French, ~~the~~ Americans and the Swedes and other interested Arab Governments). Ministers will no doubt wish to consider whether a positive response will cause any problems in domestic politics, but since the Iraqis themselves have taken the initiative, I hope that this need not be the case. I have considered whether it would be advantageous to pre-empt any criticism (or an Iraqi attempt to present our response as an initiative) by leaking the Iraqi approach to the press at this stage. I do not, however, think that this would be wise; it might frustrate the whole exercise and could have precisely the opposite effect to that required, i.e. it could draw public attention to our discussions with the Iraqis before we need to do so.

9. It seems to me that <sup>the</sup> COMET mission provides us with an opportunity to make a limited but immediate response to the Iraqis. On the assumption that a ministerial visit is out of the question,

/it

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


CONFIDENTIAL

it would I think be appropriate to send an FCO official to Baghdad at the same time as the COMET Mission, while making it clear that any discussion of inter-Governmental agreements could only follow a resumption of relations. We can decide separately who this official should be, but my present inclination is to suggest either yourself or myself for this task.

Recommendation

10. I therefore recommend that a reply should be returned to the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Paris on the lines of the attached draft telegram. Before these instructions are sent I assume that the Secretary of State will wish to consult the Prime Minister and I attach a letter to No. 10 for this purpose.



P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department

8 February 1974

Copies to: PS to the PUS  
Mr. Parsons, POD  
Mr. Cloake, TRED  
Mr. Egerton, Energy Dept.  
Mr. Craig, NENAD  
PUSD  
PCD

I agree. It would be useful if the letter to the P.M. could issue before the Secretary of State leaves for Washington, partly because the departure date of the COMET mission is so close. I would suggest Mr Wright from the FCO rather than me. M. J. Harris  
92

CONFIDENTIAL



File No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Department MED  
Drafted by P R H Wright  
(Block Capitals)  
Tel. Extn. MA 664

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification  
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Precedence

DESKBY \_\_\_\_\_Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

(Time) \_\_\_\_\_Z

POSTBY \_\_\_\_\_Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) \_\_\_\_\_Z(G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Codeword) \_\_\_\_\_

(Restrictive Prefix) \_\_\_\_\_

(Caveat/  
Privacy Marking) \_\_\_\_\_

(Deskby) \_\_\_\_\_Z

TO \_\_\_\_\_ PARIS \_\_\_\_\_ Tel. No. \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) \_\_\_\_\_

AND SAVING TO \_\_\_\_\_

REPEATED TO (for info) \_\_\_\_\_

SAVING TO (for info) \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:-

Files  
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NENAD  
PUSD  
P&CD  
TRED  
POD  
PS  
PS/PUS  
PS/Lord Balniel  
PS/Mr Amery

[TEXT]

RENWICK/CLARK TELECON OF 8 FEBRUARY: UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

*As I told you already*  
1 ~~You should~~ know ~~that~~ we have also been told by the French Embassy of a conversation between Saddam Hussain, Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and M Jobert during *which the latter spoke of the* ~~which Hussain attached importance to~~ of maintaining the dialogue between Europe and the Arabs, ~~and~~

*Hussain* said in this context that it was important that diplomatic relations should be established between London and Baghdad "in the near future".

2 We do not know the reasons for the Chargé d'Affaires' implied reference to earlier soundings by us on diplomatic relations.

3 For your information, there can be no question of our entering into negotiations on an agreement along the lines /of the

Copies to:-

No.10



of the Japanese/Iraqi agreement (which involved among other things a loan of \$1000 million to Iraq), before the resumption of full diplomatic relations.

4 Please therefore arrange for an oral response to be conveyed to the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires on the following lines.

5 HMG very much welcome the suggestion of the Iraqi Government that discussions should take place with a view to resuming diplomatic relations between our two countries. The suggestion that a Minister should visit Baghdad is much appreciated but the Iraqi Government will no doubt realise that present domestic circumstances in the period leading up to a General Election on 28 February make it impossible for Ministers to consider any visits abroad (for your information a number of Ministerial visits have already been cancelled or postponed.)

6 HMG are, however, ready to open discussions as soon as possible with the Iraqi Government with a view to resuming diplomatic relations, and to prepare the way for future co-operation between our two countries. Bearing in mind the Iraqi Government's interest in discussing economic matters, the opportunity of the forthcoming mission planned for 22 to 25 February and led by Lord Denman, the Chairman of the Council for Middle East Trade, could be taken to explore the lines of future commercial and economic co-operation. HMG further suggest that a senior FCO official should also visit Baghdad at that time, in order to discuss with the appropriate Iraqi authorities the necessary steps towards a resumption of diplomatic relations. HMG would be glad to know whether this proposal is acceptable

/to the

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to the Iraqi Government.

5 For your own information, you should know that the COMET mission will also include Sir Richard Beaumont of the Middle East Association, ~~and~~ a former British Ambassador in Baghdad.

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(16941) Dd.897300 250m 9/72 G.W.B.Led. Gp.863

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Registry  
No. ,

**DRAFT LETTER**

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:- Lord Bridges

From

Private Secretary

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

The Prime Minister will wish to know that we have just received two separate approaches from the Iraqis which in effect amount to a proposal for a resumption of diplomatic relations, which as you will recall were broken by the Iraqis in December 1971.

The first of these approaches is described in the enclosed text of a telegram from Paris; the second consists of an approach to the French Foreign Minister during his current visit to Baghdad and is described in the attached draft reply to Paris.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary attaches importance to an early and positive response to these Iraqi initiatives. We have, as you know, consistently made it clear that we deplore the practice of breaking diplomatic relations and it would be inconsistent with our policy if we were to rebuff these approaches from the Iraqi Government. There are furthermore strong commercial and economic reasons why we would in general welcome a resumption, bearing in mind particularly the estimate that Iraq's unproven resources of oil may well be second only to those of Saudi Arabia in the ~~Middle East~~ <sup>Arab world</sup>.

The terms of the Iraqi approach in Paris <sup>are</sup> ~~was~~, of course, unacceptable. As you may recall, the agreement/

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agreement reached between the Japanese and the Iraqis in January involved a loan of \$1000 million towards petroleum and allied industrial development against the supply of oil and petroleum products. Quite apart from the inherent economic and political difficulties of considering a similar agreement for ourselves, it would, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's view, be quite inappropriate to consider entering into negotiations in advance of a resumption of full diplomatic relations.

At first sight the timing of a proposed resumption of relations on the eve of a General Election is inconvenient. There are, however, some advantages for us in the timing since it does provide us with an additional reason for turning down the Iraqi suggestion of a ministerial visit without causing undue offence. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would accordingly like to reply to the approach made by the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Paris on the lines set out in the attached draft telegram. Sir Alec would be grateful if you could let us know whether the Prime Minister agrees.

I am sending a copy of this letter with enclosures to Sir John Hunt.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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RESTRICTED



Mr Alexander



12/2  
WJH  
ga

1. The French Ambassador telephoned the PUS this morning to convey a personal message which Monsieur Jobert had asked to be passed to the Secretary of State.
2. When he was in Baghdad recently, M Jobert had spoken to Saddam Hussain about the importance of maintaining the dialogue between Europe and the Arabs. Saddam Hussain had said in this context that he thought it was important that diplomatic relations should be established between London and Baghdad "in the near future". The PUS asked the French Ambassador whether any date had been mentioned. The French Ambassador replied that M Jobert's message referred only to "near".
3. I am told that Saddam Hussain is Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council.

*Mark Elliott*

M Elliott

8 February 1974

Copied to:-

✓ Mr Wright, MED

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OO F C O

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FM WASHINGTON 120415Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 543 OF 12 FEBRUARY 1974.

FOR ACLAND FROM ALEXANDER.

F C O TEL 355, UK/IRAQI RELATIONS.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREES THAT LORD DENMAN SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO DELAY HIS VISIT. HE IS HOWEVER CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRAQIS ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE THE ELECTION MIGHT LEAK. HE WOULD THEREFORE PREFER THAT NO (NO) F C O OFFICIAL SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE DENMAN MISSION. AS YOU SUGGEST, DENMAN MIGHT BE BRIEFED TO DO NO MORE THAN REPORT IRAQI OVERTURES, IF ANY.

2. IT IS OF COURSE IMPORTANT THAT THE IRAQIS SHOULD NOT FEEL THEY HAVE BEEN REBUFFED. SIR E TOMKINS MIGHT THEREFORE MAKE THE POINT IN PARIS THAT H M G DO NOT THINK IT OPPORTUNE TO PURSUE A MATTER OF THIS DELICACY DURING AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN BUT THAT PROGRESS NEED NOT BE DELAYED FOR MORE THAN TWO OR THREE WEEKS.

SYKES.

NNNN

SENT AT 0450Z/12 RM

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12 FEB 1974
NBR 25/548/1

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FM BAGHDAD 120700Z FEB.

R E S T R I C T E D

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 39 OF 12 FEBRUARY 1974,  
INFO IMMEDIATE VISFO.

VISIT OF IRAQ FOREIGN MINISTER.

FURTHER OUR TEL 033 OF 7 FEBRUARY MFA SAY MINISTER  
AND HIS WIFE TRAVELLING 13 OR 14 FEBRUARY. WE ARE TRYING  
TO OBTAIN FLIGHT DETAILS.

2. THEY WILL BE ACCOMPANIED OR PRECEDED BY ADC MAHMOUD  
NATIK SHKIR BORN 1944 VAF 384 (SEE OUR TEL VISA 41 OF  
12 FEBRUARY)

3. ADC WILL IN ANY CASE LEAVE ON 13 FEBRUARY. IN  
CIRCUMSTANCES WE PROPOSE TO ISSUE FOR ADC.

DONOVAN

F I L E S

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M & VD  
NEWS D  
MR WEIR

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FM BAGHDAD 121000Z

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TOP COPY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 40 OF 12 FEBRUARY/<sup>24</sup>INFO ROUTINE TO  
VISO AND CAIRO.

IRAQ FOREIGN MINISTER.

15

13/2  
19

FURTHER TO OUR TEL 39 OF 12 FEB

MFA SAY MINISTER GOING TO UK VIA CAIRO.  
STILL NO FIRM DETAILS OF ARRIVAL IN UK.

DONOVAN

FILES

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M & VD  
NEWS D  
MR WEIR

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
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17

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FM BAGHDAD 121030Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 42 OF 12 FEBRUARY/INFO ROUTINE  
TO CAIRO AND VISFO.

VISIT OF IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER.

FURTHER OUR TEL 40 OF 12 FEBRUARY.  
MFA HAVE JUST INFORMED US THAT MINISTER IS NOW GOING DIRECT  
TO LONDON TOMORROW 13 FEBRUARY BY IRAQI AIRWAYS FLIGHT IA 035  
ETA HEATHROW 1930.

DONOVAN

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18.

PUSD

~~RC (WEEKENDS ONLY)~~

Oil

MR J G LIVERMAN DEPT ENERGY  
MR M WATTS DEPT ENERGY  
THAMES HOUSE SOUTH

**CONFIDENTIAL**

2-  
2- RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
12 FEB 1974  
NBR 25/481

Mr. BURTON

INVESTIGATION COM ? Tehran.  
8/12/72 Repeated to  
RY, INFO ROUTINE CAIRO Tehran as  
IS KUWAIT ABU DHABI Tel. No 53.  
JEDDA

TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 190 OF 12 FEBRUARY, INFO ROUTINE CAIRO TEL AVIV BEIRUT AMMAN BAGHDAD DAMASCUS KUWAIT ABU DHABI WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK, AND INFO SAVING TO BAHREIN TRIPOLI MOSCOW.

FRANCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. THE SOUS-DIRECTEUR DU LEVANT IN THE QUAI D'ORSAY SAID THAT THERE WAS LITTLE DISCUSSION OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE DURING M JOBERT'S VISIT TO IRAQ. NOR WOULD THIS HAVE BEEN PROFITABLE; THE IRAQIS WERE SO INTRANSIGENT, THEY SEEMED DISTRUSTFUL EVEN OF THE SYRIANS.
2. PREDICTABLY, M JOBERT FOUND THE IRAQIS SUSPICIOUS OF THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE. THEY SUPPORTED THE ALGERIAN PROPOSAL FOR A U.N. SPECIAL ASSEMBLY. M JOBERT TOLD THEM THE STAGE WHICH HAD BEEN REACHED OVER THE EUROPE-ARAB DIALOGUE. SADDAM HUSSEIN WELCOMED THE IDEA AND IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT HE SAID THAT IRAQ ENVISAGED A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AND GERMANY. (WE TOLD ROUILLON OF THE DEMARCHE MADE BY THE IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HERE ABOUT THIS- MY TELEGRAM NO 179, NOT TO ALL).

3. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF JOBERT'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD WAS TO CREATE A FAVOURABLE CLIMATE FOR THE EXTENSION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH

~~1940. THIS COUNTRY BE PARTLY ORIENTATED TOWARDS AGRICULTURE. THE~~



IRAQ. THIS WOULD BE PARTLY ORIENTATED TOWARDS AGRICULTURE. THE FRENCH MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE WOULD VISIT IRAQ IN MAY. M MESSMER WOULD GO THERE IN THE AUTUMN. INDICATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS IN WHICH THE FRENCH ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED FOLLOW BY BAG

4. ROUILLON SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MEETING WITH THE PALESTINIANS AT PALMYRA. NOR HAD ANY PALESTINIAN EMISSARY COME TO PARIS. BUT M JOBERT WAS GOING TO CAIRO ON 6 MARCH AND THEN TO BEIRUT. HE MIGHT ALSO GO TO AMMAN. A MEETING WITH ARAFAT IN BEIRUT WAS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. THE FRENCH WOULD NOT RECOGNISE A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, IF ONE WERE SET UP NOW. BUT THERE COULD BE NO SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT THE PALESTINIANS: IT WAS NO USE TREATING THEM LIKE POLITICAL LEPERS.

5. ROUILLON ADDED THAT THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE VISITING PARIS FROM 18 - 23 FEBRUARY. THE FRENCH WERE NOT CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT THE EGYPTIANS (AND THE RUSSIANS) WOULD SEEK TO USE RENEWAL OF THE U N E F MANDATE AS A LEVER TO TRY TO SECURE FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN SINAI, BUT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT SEEK TO USE THIS OCCASION TO MAKE THEIR DIPLOMATIC COMEBACK. THE FRENCH WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY REGARD THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AS PROVISIONAL IT MUST BE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER WITHDRAWAL. THIS WOULD BE ONE OF THE MAIN SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED WITH FAHMY.

6. ROUILLON SAID THAT THERE WERE NO PRESENT PLANS FOR MR. EBAN TO COME TO PARIS, AND NO DEFINITE PLANS YET FOR M JOBERT TO GO TO TEL AVIV. BUT IT SEEMED TO BE M JOBERT'S INTENTION TO VISIT ISRAEL LATER THIS YEAR.

7. ROUILLON SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE STILL HAVING DIFFICULTIES IN ABU DHABI ABOUT FINALISING THE CONTRACT FOR MIRAGE F 1'S. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE FRENCH ARE SELLING 20 MIRAGE F 1'S TO KUWAIT.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVINGS TO: BAHREIN TRIPOLI AND MOSCOW.

TOMKINS

NNNN



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19

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CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 121730Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 43 OF 12 FEBRUARY/1974 INFO ROUTINE TO  
CAIRO AND VISFO.

MY TEL 42.

FOREIGN MINISTERS VISIT.

HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS VISIT IS POSTPONED.

WILL GIVE DETAILS OF VISIT WHEN KNOWN.

DONOVAN

FILES

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P & CD

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NEWS D

MR WEIR

13/2  
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(20)

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Mr. Le Quesne  
Private Secretary

*[Signature]* 14/2

*Amended to send  
14/2  
pa*

#### UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

My submission of 8 February refers. In the light of the Secretary of State's comments on the submission, as amplified by Washington telegram No. 543, I now attach a revised draft telegram to Paris containing the lines on which H.M. Ambassador should reply to the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires' approach.

2. We have since received Baghdad telegram No. 42 advising us that the Iraqi Foreign Minister will be paying a private visit to London on 13 February in connection with medical treatment for his wife. I would have suggested that we take the same action with him as we took with General Ghaidan, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, who visited London last August, when Mr. Parsons and I paid a courtesy call on him. However, in view of the Secretary of State's reservations on my earlier submission, I assume he would not wish similar action to be taken at this time with the Iraqi Foreign Minister.

*[Signature]*

P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department


12 February 1974

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Mr. Parsons, POD  
Mr. Cloake, TRED  
Mr. Egerton, Energy Dept.  
Mr. Craig NENAD  
PUSD  
PCD

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*[Signature]*  
17/2





(21)  
Enter - assumption of relations file  
16/5/14/2

NOTE TO PRESS OFFICERS

IRAQ

1 We have no on the record comment to make about press reports that Iraq will resume diplomatic relations with Britain soon and that <sup>a</sup>Taleb Shbib, the former Director of the Arab League office in New York, will be nominated as Iraqi Ambassador to London.

2 Unattributably, we can say that there have been some indications that the Iraqi Government might be interested in a resumption of diplomatic relations with HMG. This is obviously something that will require [further] discussion at the appropriate time. It is therefore premature to talk about the nomination of Ambassadors [and we have not received any indication from the Iraqi Government as to whom they might wish to nominate as their Ambassador in London in the event of a resumption of diplomatic relations.]

3 NB. It was in December 1971 that Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Britain following the <sup>Iranian</sup> occupation of the Tunbs. <sup>then</sup> Since <sup>then</sup> British interests have been looked after by the Swedish Embassy in Baghdad <sup>and</sup> Iraqi interests by the Afghan Embassy in London.

GWPH

14 February 1974



(22)

Mr. Bingham 14/2  
ja

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 14 FEB 1974 NBR 5/548/1
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See also tel. nr.

*[Signature]*

14/2

Mr. Weir  
Private Secretary

UK/IRAQI RELATIONS

News Department have this morning been asked by the BBC for comment on a report being carried by UPI and Associated Press of a story in the Beirut newspaper Al Nahar that Iraq will resume diplomatic relations with Britain soon and that Taleb Shabib, a former Director of the Arab League Office in New York, will be nominated as Iraqi Ambassador in London.

2. As you know, the Iraqis have indeed made a recent approach via H.M. Ambassador in Paris indicating that they would welcome a Ministerial visit to Baghdad to discuss a resumption of diplomatic relations and to negotiate an agreement on the lines of the recent agreement reached with the Japanese (involving a \$1000million loan). Saddam Hussein, the Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, also told M. Jobert during the latter's recent visit to Baghdad that he envisaged a resumption of diplomatic relations with Britain and West Germany in the near future.

3. The Secretary of State has commented on my recent submission that he does not wish a decision to be taken on the resumption of relations with Iraq before the General Election, and also turned down my suggestion that a senior official should visit Baghdad next week on the grounds that this might leak.

4. I have discussed the question with News Department and we recommend that the following line should be taken with the BBC and, as appropriate, at News Department's press conference this

/morning

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ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY  
British Interests Section  
BAGHDAD

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 15 FEB 1974 NBR 25/98/1.
--------------------------------------------------------------

P K Williams Esq.,  
Middle East Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London.

Your reference

Our reference 3/3

Date 27 January 1974

Dear Peter,

Thank you for your letter of 4 January. By now you will also have seen my manuscript note to Graham Burton making the same point about a visitor.

2. I'm sorry we were too late to catch Christopher Mayhew, particularly as Rex Hunt in his minute of 10 December had put forward the idea of an M.P. Sadly the reaction to our other feelers is a long time in coming. Saadoun Ghaidan seems to be marking time on any idea of going to UK again. However he and his party have had visas in their passports since December, and there is a faint possibility that he has been and returned without informing us.

3. As for Lord Denmans visit, the Minister of Economy has not deigned to reply despite many reminders to his staff, so I can only assume that they are disinterested.

Yours ever,  
Ian

I. McCluney

Hi Poutash 14/2  
Enter p. 14/2



CONFIDENTIAL

morning:

"We have <sup>recently</sup> received <sup>indications that</sup> ~~a very recent approach~~ from the Iraqi Government ~~which indicates that they~~ envisage an early resumption of diplomatic relations with HMG, ~~but~~ <sup>T</sup> this is obviously something that will require further discussion. It is therefore premature to talk about the nomination of Ambassadors and we have not received any indication from the Iraqi Government as to whom they might wish to nominate as their Ambassador in London in the event of a resumption of diplomatic relations."

5. News Department would not add any further comment on where <sup>or who</sup> the approach was made.



P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department

14 February 1974

Copies to: PS to PUS  
News Department  
PCD

*I suggest being a little less categorical  
— which might annoy the Iraqis.*

*Moham*

*14/2*



GRS 80

CYPHER CAT A

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 142227Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE F C O TELNO 137 OF 14 FEBRUARY/INFO SAVING BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELNO. 27 TO BAGHDAD: UK/IRAQI RELATIONS

1. WHEN I SAW SHABIB TODAY ON OTHER BUSINESS (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 135), HE SAID THAT BEFORE HE HAD LEFT BAGHDAD, HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO ASK ME TO INFORM YOU THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WERE READY AT ANY TIME TO RECEIVE A BRITISH MISSION TO DISCUSS THE RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS AND ALL OTHER MATTERS, INCLUDING ECONOMIC. THE MESSAGE HAD ALREADY BEEN PASSED TO YOU BY OTHER CHANNELS BUT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WISHED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT IT. SHABIB ADDED THAT HE ASSUMED THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ELECTION, WE MIGHT WISH TO POSTPONE THE DESPATCH OF A MISSION FOR A FEW WEEKS.

2. I THANKED SHABIB FOR HIS MESSAGE WHICH I UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON TO YOU.

F C O PASS SAVING BAGHDAD

MAITLAND

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

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1.5 FEB 1974

NBR 25/248/1

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NBR 25/248/1

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
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TO IMMEDIATE PARIS TELNO 83 DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1974  
YOUR TELS NOS 179 AND 190 (PARAGRAPH 2):  
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

485/2  
1a

THESE EXPRESSIONS OF IRAQI INTEREST IN THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS ARE ENCOURAGING, AND I HAVE CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY THAT A SENIOR FCO OFFICIAL MIGHT ACCOMPANY THE FORTHCOMING COMMITTEE FOR MIDDLE EAST TRADE MISSION TO BAGHDAD TO PURSUE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRAQIS. I AM, HOWEVER, CONCERNED THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRAQIS BEFORE THE ELECTION MIGHT LEAK (ONE REPORT HAS ALREADY APPEARED IN THE BEIRUT PRESS) AND THEREFORE PROPOSE TO LIMIT ACTION AT THIS STAGE TO ARRANGING FOR LORD DENMAN, THE LEADER OF THE COMET MISSION, TO BE BRIEFED ABOUT THE IRAQI MOVE AND TO DO NO MORE THAN REPORT ANY IRAQI OVERTURES WHICH MIGHT OCCUR DURING THE VISIT.

2. IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO PRESENT OUR REPLY TO THE IRAQIS IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL NOT FEEL THEIR APPROACH HAS BEEN REBUFFED AND TO GO ON RECORD AS RECOGNISING THEIR APPROACH AS AN INITIATIVE ON THEIR PART. PLEASE THEREFORE ARRANGE FOR AN ORAL RESPONSE TO BE CONVEYED TO THE IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.

3. HMG ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE SUGGESTION OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THAT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITH A VIEW TO RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE SUGGESTION THAT A MINISTER SHOULD VISIT BAGHDAD IS MUCH APPRECIATED BUT THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT WILL NO DOUBT REALISE THAT PREOCCUPATIONS OVER THE PERIOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTION ON 28 FEBRUARY MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR MINISTERS TO CONSIDER ANY VISITS ABROAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE (FOR HIS INFORMATION A NUMBER OF MINISTERIAL VISITS HAVE ALREADY BEEN CANCELLED OR POSTPONED.) HOWEVER, BEARING IN MIND THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT'S STATED INTEREST IN DISCUSSING ECONOMIC MATTERS, HMG SUGGEST THAT THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE FORTHCOMING MISSION PLANNED FOR 22-25 FEBRUARY AND LED BY LORD DENMAN, THE CHAIRMAN OF COMET, COULD BE TAKEN TO EXPLORE THE LINES OF FUTURE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. LORD DENMAN WILL BE AWARE OF THE DETAILS OF OUR CONTACTS IN PARIS. HMG WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

/4.

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4. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE COMET MISSION WILL ALSO INCLUDE SIR RICHARD BEAUMONT OF THE MIDDLE EAST ASSOCIATION, A FORMER AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD.
5. YOU SHOULD GIVE THE DETAILS OF THE MESSAGE AND BACKGROUND TO THE FRENCH. IF THEY SHOW SIGNS OF REGARDING OUR RESPONSE AS LUKEWARM, GIVEN THEIR EARLIER ASSISTANCE IN SOUNDING THE IRAQIS, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE TIMING OF THE IRAQI APPROACH PRESENTS DIFFICULTIES FOR US BUT THAT WE SHALL KEEP THE QUESTION UNDER REVIEW AND HOPE TO BE ABLE TO FOLLOW UP THE IRAQI APPROACH WITHIN TWO OR THREE WEEKS.

**DOUGLAS-HOME**

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
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TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 27 DATED 14 FEBRUARY INFO PRIORITY  
PARIS TEHRAN KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA ABU DHABI DUBAI MUSCAT JEDDA  
CAIRO DAMASCUS BEIRUT WASHINGTON STOCKHOLM BONN TEL AVIV  
UKMIS NEW YORK

UK/IRAQI RELATIONS.

IN REPLY TO REQUESTS FOR COMMENT ON A REPORT CARRIED BY THE  
AGENCIES OF A STORY IN THE BEIRUT NEWSPAPER AL NAHAR THAT IRAQ  
WILL RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN SOON AND THAT  
TALEB SHABIB, THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE ARAB LEAGUE OFFICE IN  
NEW YORK, WILL BE NOMINATED AS IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, NEWS  
DEPARTMENT ARE DECLINING ANY COMMENT ON THE RECORD.

2. IN UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING, NEWS DEPARTMENT HAVE SAID THAT  
THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT MIGHT  
BE INTERESTED IN A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH HMG.  
THIS IS OBVIOUSLY SOMETHING THAT WILL REQUIRE DISCUSSION AT THE  
APPROPRIATE TIME. IT IS THEREFORE PREMATURE TO TALK ABOUT THE  
NOMINATION OF AMBASSADORS.

3. FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY, THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER HAS  
TOLD ME THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD SADDAM HUSSEIN,  
THE VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL, TOLD  
HIM, IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN  
EUROPE AND THE ARABS, THAT HE "ENVISAGED AN EARLY RESUMPTION  
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH HMG". H.M. AMBASSADOR IN PARIS  
HAS ALSO RECEIVED AN APPROACH FROM THE IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES  
INDICATING THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME A  
MINISTERIAL VISIT TO DISCUSS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND FUTURE  
ECONOMIC COOPERATION. A REPLY IS BEING CONVEYED TO THE IRAQIS  
THROUGH THE SAME CHANNEL THAT HMG ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE SUGGESTION  
THAT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITH A VIEW TO RESUMING  
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BUT THAT PREOCCUPATIONS OVER THE PERIOD  
OF THE GENERAL ELECTION MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR MINISTERS TO  
CONSIDER ANY VISITS ABROAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE. A MISSION LED  
BY LORD DENMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR MIDDLE EAST



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TRADE, WILL, UNDER ARRANGEMENTS MADE PREVIOUSLY, BE IN BAGHDAD FROM 22 TO 25 FEBRUARY AND WILL BE BRIEFED TO LISTEN TO ANY FURTHER SUGGESTIONS THE IRAQIS MAY WISH TO MAKE.

4. YOU AND OTHER RECIPIENTS SHOULD NOT RAISE THIS QUESTION WITH IRAQIS UNLESS THEY DISCUSS IT WITH YOU, IN WHICH CASE YOU SHOULD KEEP CLOSELY TO THE LINES OF OUR REPLY IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE. YOU MAY HOWEVER, GIVE THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN CONFIDENCE AN ACCOUNT OF THE POSITION AS SET OUT ABOVE AND STOCKHOLM MAY SPEAK SIMILARLY TO THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT. HM REPRESENTATIVES IN TEHRAN AND KUWAIT HAVE DISCRETION TO SPEAK SIMILARLY IN CONFIDENCE TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE IS NO, REPEAT NO, INTENTION OR LIKELIHOOD OF REACHING DECISIONS ON A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS BEFORE THE ELECTION.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 212 OF 15 FEBRUARY 1974

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 83.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

1. MINISTER SAW IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THIS AFTERNOON AND SAID THE PIECE IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

2. MR WALI TOOK CAREFUL NOTE AND SAID THAT HE WOULD INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT AT ONCE AND LET US HAVE A REPLY.

3. HE SAID THAT IN SUGGESTING THE VISIT OF A MINISTER WHAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND WAS THAT ON SUCH A VISIT THE MINISTER COULD DECIDE AND ANNOUNCE THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ON THE SPOT. COULD THEY NOW TAKE IT THAT:

(I) WE WANTED IN PRINCIPLE TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AND

(II) WE WERE NOT READY TO DO THIS UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS?

EWART-BIGGS REPLIED THAT HMG WERE CERTAINLY ANXIOUS TO TALK ABOUT OPENING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WE HAD WANTED TO RESPOND TO WHAT THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD SAID TO THE AMBASSADOR.

BUT HE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT BECAUSE OF THE ELECTIONS EVERYTHING WAS RATHER IN SUSPENSE FOR THE MOMENT AND IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR A MINISTER TO GO THO BAGHDAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THIS WAS WHY WE WERE LETTING LORD DENMAN KNOW ABOUT THE EXCHANGES THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE. MR WALI WAS VERY AMIABLE AND SAID THAT HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD ALL THIS.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 47 OF 16 FEBRUARY. 1974

*Handwritten:* 24/2  
HJH pa

BRITISH/IRAQ RELATIONS.

THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR KNITSSEN PRESENTED CREDENTIALS 14 FEBRUARY AND WAS TOLD BY PRESIDENT BAKR AS PART OF A TOUR D'HORIZON THAT IRAQ HAD DIFFICULTY IN ACQUIRING GOOD RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY BECAUSE OF DIFFERING VIEWS ON PALESTINE.

2. I HOPE THIS INDICATES NOTHING MORE SERIOUS THAN BAD BRIEFING.

MCCLUNEY

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MR LEQUESNE

MR WEIR

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 49 OF 17 FEBRUARY INFO ROUTINE  
TO PARIS STOCKHOLM AND KUWAIT AND TEHRAN.

YOUR TEL 27 OF 14 FEB.

BRITAIN/ IRAQ RELATIONS.

I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO SWEDISH AMBASSADOR 16 FEBRUARY AND  
ALSO TOLD HIM OF NEWS DEPARTMENTS EXCHANGES WITH THE PRESS  
(RETRACTS 885 AND 916).

NR.

2. FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME 14 FEB OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REMARKS  
TO M. JOBERT AND ON 16 FEB OF AL NAHAR REPORT AND NEWS  
DEPARTMENTS (NO ) COMMENT AND UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING.  
AS PARIS HAVE SPOKEN TO RONILLON ABOUT IRAQI DEMARCHE  
I REPEATED THIS TO CERLE IN CONFIDENCE WITH STRICT LINE  
OF OUR REPLY.

3. RATHSMAN AND CERLE BOTH COMMENTED THAT HMG HAD BEEN  
WAITING FOR THE IRAQIS TO MAKE SOME MOVE AND IT WAS A GOOD  
SIGN THAT THEY HAD NOW DONE SO.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

MCCLUNEY

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Mr. Burton of News D  
Sphen M. Howard  
SSB 18/2

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 50 OF 17 FEB.

BRITAIN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

YOUR RETRACT 855.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE IRAQ/IRAN BORDER TROUBLES MUST  
COLOUR ANY FCO COMMENT ON UK/IRAQ RELATIONS BUT COULD NOT  
SOME GENERAL APPROVAL OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AS A MEANS  
OF RESOLVING DIFFERENCES BE EXPRESSED IN REPLY TO FURTHER  
QUESTIONS ON WHETHER UK WOULD WELCOME A RESUMPTION WITH IRAQ.

MCCLUNEY

BT

[Not sent to COI]

He has 1 fear. with  
the point of our caution. But  
I see no reason why Mrs. Dyer  
should, if not for, say that  
we do not  
open with  
branch  
relations  
as a means of dealing  
with disputes, and that  
we actually welcome any  
new British intervention.

Ph 10/2



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
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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 218 OF 18 FEBRUARY 1974.

MY TELEGRAM NO 212: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

1. IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED ON MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON TO CONVEY THE REPLY HE HAD RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD. IT WAS THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME LORD DENMAN ON THE DATES PROPOSED. THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT HE WOULD BE AUTHORISED TO DISCUSS THE LINES OF FUTURE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION, AND THAT HE WOULD BE AWARE OF OUR CONTACTS IN PARIS.

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


BRITISH EMBASSY

KUWAIT

13 February 1974

G S Burton Esq  
Middle East Department  
FCO



Dear Burton.

*Ente*  
*Mr Williams* I agree with Mr Burton  
*Mr Clark* and am mystified by  
*Mr Wright* the latter part of 84  
A and, pa.  
I should think most people  
think along the lines of para 5  
15/2

1. I have been trying to think through the pros and cons for the renewal of our diplomatic relations with Iraq, from their point of view, in the hope that this might provide some clue to their reluctance to respond to the approaches you have arranged through the French (I had hoped to have some news of these in Kuwait but Peter Hinchcliffe tells me he has heard nothing). *pa*

2. Iraqi reasons for resuming relations might be summarised as:

- a) Acceptance of Britain as friendly in October 1973. Reluctance to nationalise our share of Basrah Petroleum Company. Praise of our position on Middle East in declaration of the Nine.
- b) Continuing and increasing trade.
- c) Britain's top position as education and medical centre for Iraqis.
- d) English as the first foreign language.
- e) New found financial independence and proved power of (their) oil weapon.
- f) Success of oil nationalisation.
- g) Desire to increase military training in Britain.

These are public and obvious facts, but Iraq is also sensitive to private pressures and it might be worth considering if any exist which might tend to make them resume. I can think of three only

- a) Syria has resumed relations and we have been welcomed there.
- b) Our visa formalities are constricting and result in some refusals. They may hope for some improvement.

/c)





- c) Our approaches have been through the French who are presumably the one country they listen to in Western Europe.

3. If these are the powerful looking arguments for resuming relations, what are the Iraqi reasons for not doing so. Publically they have said over the past two years:

- a) We connived with the Iranians over the islands of Abu Musa and the Tumbs (- but relations with the Iranians have been resumed).
- b) We support the reactionary Arab countries who plot against Iraq, viz Iran, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.
- c) The broad 'imperial' past of IPC, British Mandate, etc comes in for criticism from time to time (- but their own self confidence is now well established).

4. Again there are undoubtedly private objections to resuming relations and we should consider what these might be. Everyone in Iraq is sensitive to contact with foreigners, because they fear arrest and interrogation by the various security services. Some foreigners are more feared than others in this way; probably the Iranians are top of the list. We may well be a close second. Examples of our interaction with security during the last two years might be

- a) Expulsion of three Embassy staff in late 1971.
- b) Arrest of LE Information Officer for 9 months (1972).
- c) Closure of British School of Archaeology (unexplained).
- d) Virtual expulsion of Rev Colin Davies and Father Mitze.
- e) Detention of Robert Ellis.
- f) Tailing (from time to time) of Major Field.

7 ? To this one might add the old canard of Iraqi support for the Baath, our acceptance of members of former regimes for residence in Britain and the protection demanded by Sa'adoun Ghaidan (though he got it and should be grateful).

5. In summary I can see two fears that the Iraqis may have about resuming relations. First that our close relations with their neighbours might work to their disadvantage in Baghdad, and secondly that we might use an enhanced presence to establish covert links, posing an additional and unnecessary threat to stable Baath government.

2  
AMH

h I McCluney (returned to Baghdad)



34

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
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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 25 OF 18 FEBRUARY<sup>74</sup> INFO ROUTINE TO PARIS AND KUWAIT.

YOUR TELNO 27 TO BAGHDAD; BRITAIN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

I HAVE SPOKEN AS AUTHORISED IN CONFIDENCE TO POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O TEL NO 225 DATED 19 FEBRUARY/REPTD  
FOR INFO BAGHDAD

37

BAGHDAD TEL NO 56.

1. IRAQI EMBASSY TELL US THAT MINISTER IS TRAVELLING TO  
LONDON ON BA 737 ON THURSDAY 21 FEBRUARY.

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MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 055 OF 19 FEBRUARY 1974, INFO  
ROUTINE VISFO.

(94) NBR 1/2 (1973)

YOUR TEL 338 OF 3 DECEMBER.

SAADOUN GHADAN WILL TRAVEL TO LONDON ON 1A 045  
THURSDAY 21 FEB. ETA 20.00 LOCAL, AND STAY IN THE  
FORMER AMBASSADORS RESIDENCE 15 KENSINGTON PALACE GARDENS W8.

2. CHIEF OF PROTOCOL HAS ASKED IF WE WOULD MAKE  
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MINISTERS PROTECTION AS AGREED IN  
DECEMBER.

MCCLUNEY

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AS LORD BALMOR  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR  
SIR G. ARTHUR  
MR THOMSON.

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1/2


I have arranged viz Mr. To  
for Customs Excise and  
Security to watch out for  
and treat carefully the  
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visitors.

B 2 1/2



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19

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 056 OF 19 FEBRUARY 1974, INFO  
IMMEDIATE CAIRO AND ROUTINE MOSCOW AND VISFO.

MY TEL 043 OF 12 FEBRUARY.

ABDUL BAQI - FOREIGN MINISTER LEFT BAGHDAD ON  
16 FEBRUARY FOR CAIRO. HE WILL FLY ON FROM THERE  
TO LONDON ABOUT 20 FEBRUARY.

2. CHIEF OF PROTOCOL SUGGESTS HMA CAIRO MIGHT  
BE ABLE TO INFORM YOU OF HIS ONWARD FLIGHT DETAILS.

3. IT IS RUMOURED ABDUL BAQI IS TO BE IRAQS AMBASSADOR  
IN MOSCOW FOLLOWING MEDICAL TREATMENT IN LONDON.

MCCLUNEY  
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MR WEIR

Handwritten signature or initials.

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*wh 2/2  
pa*

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TO PRIORITY BOM TELNO 144 OF 20 FEBRUARY/1974 INFO PARIS BAGHDAD  
WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 27 TO BAGHDAD: UK/IRAQI RELATIONS.

THE FRENCH EMBASSY TOLD US ON 19 FEBRUARY THAT THE GERMANS HAD  
RECEIVED A PARALLEL APPROACH FROM THE IRAQIS TO THAT MADE BY THE  
IRAQI CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES TO H.M. AMBASSADOR IN PARIS.

2. IN VIEW OF THIS, WE HAVE GIVEN THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN LONDON  
A FULL ACCOUNT IN CONFIDENCE OF THE IRAQI APPROACH AND OUR REPLY  
AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE GERMANS  
AS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRAQIS DEVELOP. THE EMBASSY, WHO WERE  
UNINFORMED ON THE SUBJECT, WELCOMED THIS SUGGESTION, PARTICULARLY  
IN VIEW OF INDICATIONS THAT THE IRAQIS ARE LIKELY TO TIE A RESUMPTION  
TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE LINES OF THE JAPANESE-IRAQI AGREEMENT  
(BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 15 OF 17 JANUARY REFERS).

See (26)

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
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EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF AFGHANISTAN  
No. 161



IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION  
21 QUEEN'S GATE  
LONDON SW7 5JG  
TELEPHONE 01 - 584 7141/6

39

*Scotland Yard are providing protection (Mr. Sterling, Home Office, arranged it) and the IIS has been informed* *25/2* *pa*

The Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan, Iraqi Interests Section presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to inform them that on Thursday, 21st February 1974, His Excellency Mr. Murtadha Abdul Baki, Foreign Minister of Iraq, will be arriving in London for a private visit, on BA flight number 737 from Cairo at 14.10 hours, and staying at the Royal Garden Hotel.

The Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan, Iraqi Interests Section would be most grateful if a form of security could be arranged for His Excellency the Foreign Minister during his stay in London. It would also be very much appreciated if the Foreign and Commonwealth Office could inform the Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan, Iraqi Interests Section of the arrangements that the esteemed Ministry deems possible.

The Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan, Iraqi Interests Section avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of its highest consideration.

London, 20th February 1974

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London.





Private Secretary  
Mr. Weir  
UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

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RECEIVED IN REGISTER NO 35 26 FEB 1974
NBR 25/548/1

M. W. G. M. M.  
M. W. G. M. M. MED

See minute.

Secretary of State

Hand  
pa.  
R 25/2

We have been informed that two Iraqi Ministers will be arriving in London at different times on Thursday, 21 February.

They are the Foreign Minister Murtadha Said Abdul Baqi Al Hadithi, and the Minister of the Interior, General Sa'adoun Ghaidan. I believe they are both coming for medical treatment, although in the former case, the position is unclear since we were originally informed that it was his wife who was seeking treatment.

2. During an earlier visit by General Ghaidan in August last year, Mr. Parsons and I took the opportunity to pay a courtesy call on him. When we first heard of the Foreign Minister's visit I was inclined, as you know, not to recommend a similar call in view of the Secretary of State's concern that news of current contacts with the Iraqis should not leak. However, there has since been a leak in Beirut and the content of our subsequent unattributable briefing to the press was tantamount to an admission that some contact had been made between representatives of the two governments. Moreover, General Ghaidan told Mr. Hunt, formerly of my Department, before he returned to Iraq in August that he hoped to see Mr. Parsons again during his next visit.

I consider that it would now seem odd to the Iraqis - indeed they might consider it to be the sort of rebuff we are anxious to avoid - if some attention was not now paid to these two senior Ministers. I therefore recommend that we should arrange for

/you

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


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you to call on both as soon as possible after their arrival.  
(I understand that Ghaidan will stay in the former Ambassador's residence at 15 Kensington Palace Gardens, W.8., and that Abdul Baqi will stay at the Royal Garden Hotel.) I consider that you should confine yourself to polite enquiries after their respective healths and to a restatement of our position in reply to the recent  
Flag C Iraqi approach in Paris (paragraph 3 of FCO telegram No. 83 to Paris).

3. The Iraqi Interests Section here have told us that the Ministers may remain in London for two to three weeks, i.e. over the period of the General Election. We must clearly consider again after 28 February what further action, if any, we should take. We shall have by then the report of the COMET mission to Baghdad.

Flag D 4. I attach for your information copies of minutes by myself and Mr. Hunt on the results of the earlier calls on General Ghaidan,  
Flag E together with copies of the somewhat dated personality reports on both Ministers.



P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department

19 February 1974

/Private Secretary

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Private Secretary

1. I discussed this problem with Mr Wright and agree with his recommendation. The timing of these visits is indeed awkward. However, considering that we have just returned a friendly response to the Iraqis' recent overtures and that basically a resumption of relations is very much in our interests (mainly from the oil point of view), I do not see how we could afford to ignore two Iraqi Ministers visiting this country for as long as the first week of their stay, ie, until the General Election.
2. But I do not think <sup>either</sup> that a call by a FCO official in London is at all as likely to attract attention, with the possibility of political embarrassment, as a visit by a FCO official to Baghdad in the context of the COMET Mission.
3. Depending on the results of the COMET Mission (and, though not I submit to the same extent, on those of the Election), I think there may well be a case for showing some Ministerial attention to the visitors as soon as possible after the Election. Ideally this might take the form of a call on the Secretary of State plus some kind of official entertainment. But we can cross that bridge when we come to it.

*M S Weir*

M S Weir

20 February 1974

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


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42



United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations  
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022



*Mr. Gough*

*man  
7/2*

M S Weir Esq  
Assistant Under-Secretary of State  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

3/20/3

Date

21 February 1974

*Mr. L. H. H. 25/2* *27/2*

*Dear Michael,*

TALEB SHIBIB

*Confirmed by Iraqi Interests  
Section: he will be accompanied  
by Aziz Al-Qadhi and Adnan  
Ra'ouf.*

*pa 25/2*

1. This is just to warn you that, when I saw Taleb Shibib this morning, he said that he was thinking of stopping off in London in order to see you next week on his way home to Baghdad. I am afraid that I said that I was sure you would be glad to see him if he decided to do so.

*Yours ever,*

*Michael.*

M C S WESTON

*1a*  
*6' 2/3*  
*see f.i. 0/1*

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Mr. Weir *so far suggest*  
*Mr. Williams*


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UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

Sir Richard Beaumont telephoned me this morning on his return from Baghdad as a member of the COMET Mission led by Lord Denman. Lord Denman has, as you know, gone on to Cairo and will not be back for several days. Sir Richard Beaumont said that the visit had been useful commercially and they had had a final interview with the Minister of Economy (Mr. McCluney has already reported the main points in his telegram No. 62). The Minister had in particular stressed that there was plenty of opportunity for British business in Iraq and that the absence of diplomatic relations was in itself no hindrance. The Minister had been at pains to emphasise that the COMET Mission was not regarded by the Iraqis as having any political significance.

2. Sir Richard said that he had also called on the Egyptian and French Ambassadors, both of whom had thought that an Iraqi resumption of diplomatic relations with us was only a matter of days. Sir Richard mentioned the current visit by the German Under-Secretary and said that the Germans evidently expected a resumption within about ten days. In reply to my question, Sir Richard said that the Iraqis had at no point during the Mission directly asked them about HMG's attitude to a resumption.

3. On other points, Sir Richard Beaumont said that it was clear that Saddam Hussein now regarded himself as the economic overlord and was ready to ride rough-shod over the law (including even the law of income tax) in order to pursue economic development in Iraq. The Iraqis had made it clear that there would be no discrimination against British companies; on the contrary, the traditional connection with Britain should work to our advantage. The Iraqis had also made it clear that money was no object although credit might possibly be useful for some large projects, not because the Iraqis were unable to pay themselves, but as a means of keeping the contractors up to the mark.



P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department

27 February 1974

Copies to: TRED  
Personnel Operations Department  
Mr. Williams

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CONFIDENTIAL - 5 MAR 1974

NBR 25/28/1

Mr. Clark  
Mr. Williams  
Mr. Burton

We will have to think what a 'political delegation' could look like.

# UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

As agreed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Weir called on the Iraqi Foreign and Interior Ministers this morning. I accompanied him, and the Head of the Iraqi Interests Section, Mr. Falaki, and his Deputy, Mr. Khalil, were present at both interviews (although they arrived five minutes after ourselves at the second meeting).

2. After we had finished with the appropriate courtesies, the Iraqi Foreign Minister said that discussions about a resumption of relations with the United Kingdom had continued for the past year and a half and the recent approach, which had resulted from discussions between himself and the Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, should be seen as part of the Iraqi Government's desire to improve their relations with the major countries in the developed world. He believed that a resumption was in the mutual interests of both Iraq and Britain and that it was important that the British Government should show interest not only in the rights of the Arabs, but also in the development of their economies. Expanding on this point the Foreign Minister said that what was required was for the British Government to take a part in persuading British companies to participate in the development of Iraq as the French and Japanese had. Mr. Weir explained that there were certain difficulties for us in accepting so close a relationship between government and industry.

3. Mr. Weir said that Ministers had been interested by the approach which we had received both in Paris and in New York, but that the Foreign Minister would understand that the Government was preoccupied with domestic political affairs at present. After referring to Lord Denman's mission to Baghdad (of which the Foreign Minister was clearly well aware) Mr. Weir asked how long the Foreign Minister would be in London. When the Minister said that he was likely to be here for the next ten days or so (but that the precise length of time depended on his doctors), Mr. Weir expressed the hope that we might be able to take advantage of the Foreign Minister's presence in London to pursue the question of a resumption after the Election. In reply the Minister made it clear that a "political delegation" to Baghdad would be necessary before resumption could come about. Mr. Weir made no

/commitment

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commitment that such a delegation would be possible and we left on pious hopes that a resumption would take place soon.

4. The conversation with the Minister of the Interior (which took place at the Iraq Embassy house in Gunnersbury Avenue) was much more lively. General Ghaidan appeared to have made a good recovery from his wounds last year and was appreciative of the treatment he had received. He spoke warmly about HMG's stand on the Arab/Israel question since the October war and said that this had been much appreciated both by the Government and the people in Iraq.

5. General Ghaidan said that after his previous visit he had recommended that diplomatic relations should be resumed and he hoped very much that this could happen soon. Like the Foreign Minister, General Ghaidan emphasised that what was required was a "political delegation" to Baghdad.

P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department

25 February 1974

Copy to: Mr. Weir

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Reference.....

Mr Wright

**UK/IRAQ RELATIONS: MEETING TO DISCUSS STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD**

1 The current staffing arrangements in the Interests Section in Baghdad are as follows:

Head of Interests Section Mr I McCluney Grade 7E

Commercial Section: Mr P Donovan Grade 6  
Mr B C Seddon Grade 9

Consular/Administration: Mr R J Saltwell Grade 7E

Archivist/Assistant  
Consular/Administration: Mr M Plant Grade 10

In addition, there are three Chancery guards (one SO2, two SO3) and two CGOs.

2 Mr Williams and I recommend, subject to the views of other Departments, that a suitable establishment for the new Embassy should be something on the following lines:

Ambassador Grade 3  
Head of Chancery Grade 5  
Second Secretary,  
Chancery Grade 7A/E

Commercial Section:

Counsellor Grade 4

(I anticipate that arguments will be put forward on the size of our exports to Iraq over the last three years - 1971 £25 million, 1972 £26 million, 1973 £28 million - so that the Commercial Section need not be headed by an officer of a higher rank than Grade 5. However, in view of our assessment of the potential importance of the Iraqi market, together with the fact that most imports are negotiated through State trading organizations of which the Heads are usually called Directors General and appear to be the only persons with the power to make decisions, I consider that an officer of Counsellor rank would be much more likely to achieve the necessary access at important levels.)

First Secretary Grade 6

(I believe that traditionally a Counsellor must be supported by at least a Grade 6 officer. We should have no objection to this post being filled at Second Secretary level however.

Third Secretary/Attaché Grade 9.

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/Consular



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**Consular/Administration:**

**Second Secretary** Grade 7E

**Administration Officer** Grade 9

(Provided there are local staff of sufficient calibre, I see no reason why the above two officers should not cover each other's posts during leave absences).

**Registry:**

**Archivist** Grade 9/senior Grade 10

**Section Clerk** Grade 10

I am not competent to judge the requirement for communications officers and security guards.

3 I understand the MOD would like to be represented by two Attachés of Lieutenant Colonel and Wing Commander rank.

4 In view of Iraq's potential importance in economic and oil terms, other requirements could perhaps be met by the appointment of 1/2 Secretary Economic Officer.

5 There remains the problem of the assimilation of the existing staff in Baghdad. Subject to POD's views, I see every advantage in Mr McCluney continuing to fill the Second Secretary slot in Chancery for the rest of his tour and for Mr Donovan, Mr Saltwell and Mr Seddon to fill the proposed slots as outlined in my paragraph 2 above.

G S Burton  
Middle East Department

7 March 1974

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W.E. Quantrill Esq.,  
Personnel Policy Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London SW1.

HCB/K

2nd March, 1974

Some time soon you are going to be considering what staff are required in Baghdad when diplomatic relations are renewed. More experienced heads than mine will no doubt tackle this problem, but you may find it useful if I draw together some of the main points as seen from this end.

2. Security Officers: Dick Saltwells letter 98/1 of 11 Feb (Security Dept) proposed a reduction in Security Officers and an improved telephone watch and local guard system. Our main change round of Security Officers takes place in June and that would be a good time to arrange for a reduction in staff.

3. Third Secretary: My letter 3/1 of 15 December also suggested that a Third Secretary in Chancery would be a useful addition whether or not our purely caretaking role is to come to an end. This post could also usefully precede a resumption in relations if it is to be long delayed.

4. Confidential Secretary: Turning to points not previously raised, I should like to appeal at an early stage for an S2 Confidential Secretary with Registry experience. We have managed well hitherto with locally engaged wives of staff, but the Confidential mail has increased threefold since October last year with Baghdad's involvement in the Middle East and oil crises. The settling-in process in Chancery would be aided considerably by the early appointment of an experienced S2. She could become PA to the Head of Mission when one is appointed.

5. Administration: The extra work of finding houses, refurnishing, re-decorating etc., is more than Vice-Consul Saltwell could manage unassisted. His visa work is already 25% up on last years figures for January and February, and likely to grow further. Our Archivist Michael Plant doubles in the Consulate for two hours a day, but his work is also growing (see para 4) and neither are available for additional administration work, which in recent months has been delegated more to local staff. To handle any resumption at this

/end

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2.

end we shall need an experienced Administration Officer - perhaps only for a short time, but someone capable of handling the leasing of additional accommodation, refurnishing and staff reorganisation connected with the re-establishment of an Embassy. It is likely we should need a DOE team to sort out furniture.

6. It would be presumptuous to offer my thoughts on the appointment of senior staff, but I know a Commercial Counsellor was considered in the past, and may be considered again. If one is appointed, I suggest that the title "Commercial" is dropped in Iraq. This would give him enhanced status with Iraqi departments, who are used to dealing with Embassy rather than Commercial officials for economic work with Eastern European Embassies. Peter Donovan (1st Secretary - Commercial) strongly supports this suggestion.

7. If there is to be any new Consular appointment we should seriously consider finding an Arabist. While it is true that for the strict issuing of visas and community work Arabic is not necessary, the Consulate sees and interviews more Iraqis than any other section of the Embassy. It can therefore be a useful political listening post, particularly as travellers to UK are often people of means and influence.

8. One general point; Britain loomed so large here in the past that it might not be a bad thing to adopt a low profile in numbers and activity in the early days of the new Embassy. Given the right people, Baghdad can operate well as a small post. Our commercial and political interests here are not of the same order as in Tehran or Kuwait. They may be greater than in Syria particularly as the country develops, but the future remains uncertain in Iraq and it would be wise to spread our wings with caution to begin with. A European approach may serve us best. We can do a great deal to weld our bickering continental partners together in their approach to Iraq's future.

I. McCluney



*Mr Wright**Thank you*

MR MASON'S MIDDLE EAST TOUR

1 Following his minute of 26 February, I have arranged for Mr John Mason (ECGD) to call on you for a word about UK/Iraq relations at 4.00 pm on 27 March and subsequently on Mr Craig.

P K Williams  
Middle East Department

5 March 1974

cc: Mr Craig, NENAD  
Mr J C M Mason, ECGD

*Bu*  
*Bu 26/3*  
*noted*  
*9th 12/3*  
*B.*



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per

MEETING IN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON 8 MARCH 1974  
TO CONSIDER STAFFING REQUIREMENTS FOR A POSSIBLE FUTURE EMBASSY  
IN BAGHDAD

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
-8 MAR 1974  
NBR 25/48/1

Present

Mr Wright Mr Williams Mr Burton	}	Middle East Department
Mr Blair		Consular Department
Mr Ballantyne		Trade Relations and Exports Department
Mr Buckmaster		Guidance & Information Policy Department
Miss Beckett Col Griffiths Mr Hardie	}	Personnel Operations Department
Mr Woodrow		Personnel Policy Department

1 Mr Wright opened the meeting by giving the political background to the possible resumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq and asked that the meeting should attempt to arrive at an ideal staffing structure for a future Embassy in Baghdad. The format agreed was as follows:

TITLE	GRADE	COMMENT
Ambassador	3	
Counsellor	4	With commercial and economic responsibilities
Head of Chancery	5	
First Secretary Economic	5	
Second Secretary	7	With information responsibilities
<u>Commercial Section</u>		
First Secretary	6	
Attaché	9	There is a possibility of replacing the Grade 9 with a Grade 7E in due course or alternatively of creating an 7E post. /additional



TITLE	GRADE	COMMENT
<u>Consular Section</u>		
First Secretary	6	
Attaché/Vice-Consul	9	
<u>Administration Section</u>		
Second Secretary	7E	
Assistant Administration Officer/Accountant	10	
<u>Registry</u>		
2 Clerical officers	10	
<u>Communications Branch</u>		
2 officers	CBO	
<u>Security Officers</u>		
1 Security Officer	S02	
2 Security Officers	S03	
<u>Secretarial</u>		
1 PA/Ambassador		
1 PA/Counsellor		
1 PA/First Secretary Economic		

2 Additional secretarial staff. It was agreed that there will probably be a requirement for an additional shorthand/typist at post but that the post would be consulted as to the future wishes of the wives of officers currently filling secretarial posts.

3 Military staff. Mr Wright stressed that we should not appear to be sending too many Military Attachés initially and that an ideal complement would not involve more than two officers, eg one Lieutenant Colonel and one Wing Commander.

4 Steps to be taken immediately after a resumption. It was agreed that the present Head of the Interests Section, Mr McCluney, should  
/become



become Chargé d'Affaires immediately. The name of our proposed Ambassador should be given to the Iraqis as soon as possible in order to avoid the impression that we were dragging our feet. It was not, however, necessary for the new Ambassador to arrive in Baghdad before early autumn. However, the Grade 5 Head of Chancery should arrive in Baghdad as soon as possible (June appears to be the earliest convenient date) and that priority should be given to the appointment of the new Consul and Vice-Consul in order to release the current Grade 7E Consul/Administration Officer (Mr Saltwell) to take full responsibility for the increased administrative tasks involved in expanding the current set-up.



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(17)



**United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations**  
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

M S Weir Esq  
Assistant Under-Secretary  
of State  
FCO

(M.C.) Your reference

Our reference

Date

3/20/4

7 March 1974

*Mr. Gough*  
*Mr. 11/3*

*Dr. 12/3*

*Mr. Clerk 12/3*  
*Mr. Burt 12/3*  
*pa*

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
14 MAR 1974  
NBR 25/578/1

(12)

*Dear Michael,*

TALIB SHIBIB

1. Please refer to my letter 3/20/3 of 21 February.
2. I had lunch with Talib Shibib today. He said that he had stayed on in New York much longer than he had planned in order to discuss with the Secretary-General the appointment of the Special Representative to deal with the Iran/Iraq question. He now planned, however, to fly to England overnight on 17 March and to be in London on 18 and 19 March. He very much hoped to see you and would give you a ring. If you wished to contact him, he suggested that you should do so through "the Embassy" (I understand that the Iraqi Interests Section of the Afghan Embassy is in the old Iraqi Embassy building).
3. Shibib said that he hoped that the change of Government in the UK would not mean any delay in the plan to send a mission to Baghdad to discuss the resumption of relations. When I asked him what his views were on the possibility of being Ambassador in London himself, he said that he was quite frankly in two minds. The Foreign Minister had mentioned the possibility to him as well as the possibility that he might return here to New York as Permanent Representative. He was not sure that he really wanted to accept either appointment but he did not feel strongly and he had decided to leave it in the lap of the gods.
4. I am sure you will have noted from our telegrams that we were very impressed by the way in which Shibib handled the recent Security Council debate. Donald Maitland has suggested that it would be a good thing if you were to mention to Shibib that we had commented favourably on his performance.

*Yours ever,*  
*Michael*

M C S WESTON

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 15 MAR 1971 NBR 25/248/1
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Mr. Clark  
Mr. Williams W 14/3  
Mr. Burton 14/3

## CALL ON THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

Having heard from the Iraqi Interests Section that the Iraqi Foreign Minister was due to return to Baghdad tomorrow, Mr. Weir and I paid a courtesy farewell call on him at the Royal Garden Hotel this afternoon.

2. The Minister spoke at some length about the need of Middle East Governments to pay attention to their public opinion and said that public attitudes to countries such as Britain were bound to affect relations between individual Arab Governments and ourselves. He referred to previous statements made by Mr. Wilson during the October war and expressed concern that HMG's policy on the Middle East might change following the General Election.

3. Mr. Weir referred to the passage in the Queen's Speech yesterday expressing the Government's support for Resolutions 242 and 338 and also told the Foreign Minister that Mr. Callaghan had sent instructions to our Ambassadors in the Arab countries asking them to assure the Governments to which they were accredited that HMG wished to maintain and improve their relations with the Arab world. The Foreign Minister said that he understood from the press that the Prime Minister had sent messages to Mrs. Meir and to President Sadat. Mr. Weir said that he knew that Mr. Wilson had sent a message to President Sadat and Mr. Callaghan had similarly sent a message to Mr. Ismail Fahmi. He was not aware of any message to Mrs. Meir; ~~sent to her certainly not gone through Foreign Office channels.~~

4. The Foreign Minister said that he hoped very much that British policy towards the Middle East would not change and referred to the Iraqi Government's hope that relations between Iraq and Britain could be resumed. Mr. Weir said that, speaking as an official, he shared this hope, but the Foreign Minister would understand that Ministers were still heavily preoccupied with parliamentary business and internal questions and had not yet had an opportunity to consider the question of our relations with Iraq. Mr. Weir referred to the resumption of relations between Iraq and West Germany. The Foreign Minister replied

/that


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that the Germans had sent a suitable delegation under "a Foreign Minister" to Baghdad and relations had therefore been restored. Unfortunately, the commercial delegation which we had sent had not been "suitable" since they were not able to discuss political matters. Mr. Weir told the Foreign Minister that it would be very difficult for any British Minister to travel abroad for some considerable time in view of the Government's minority in the House of Commons. Mr. Weir confirmed that as soon as we were ready to transmit a reply to the Iraqi proposals this would be done through their Chargé d'Affaires in Paris.

5. At the end of the meeting the Foreign Minister said that he was grateful for our call and in particular for Mr. Weir's explanation both of the Government's policy on the Middle East and of our parliamentary difficulties. He repeated his hope that relations between us would improve and that HMG's policy on the Middle East would remain satisfactory.

  
P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department

13 March 1974

Copies to: Mr. Weir  
PUSD

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Mr. Weir

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19

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

Problem

Flag A H.M. Ambassador in Paris recently received an approach from the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires suggesting that a delegation, led by a Minister, should visit Baghdad to discuss the resumption of diplomatic relations. We sent an interim reply welcoming the Iraqi approach but explaining that in view of the forthcoming General Election it was impossible to respond positively at that stage. How should we now follow up?

Background

2. The Iraqis broke relations with us in December 1971 on the grounds of alleged "collusion" in the Iranian seizure of the Tunbs and Abu Musa. Since then, both countries have maintained Interests Sections in the respective capitals restricted to commercial and consular work.

3. After several indications that the Iraqis were considering a resumption of relations, an approach was made by the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Paris to H.M. Ambassador there on 8 February saying

Flag A that the Iraqis were ready to receive a delegation led by a Minister authorised to discuss the resumption of relations; the delegation should include economists authorised to negotiate agreements with the Iraq Government on the lines of the recent Iraqi/Japanese agreement (providing for a Japanese loan of \$1,000 million). We replied on 14 February expressing our appreciation of the approach but pointing

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/out



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out that preoccupations over the period of the General Election made it impossible for Ministers to consider any visits abroad in the near future. A previously arranged COMET mission visited Baghdad from 22 to 25 February but received no political approach from the Iraqis. Simultaneously, however, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior were visiting the UK privately and made it clear that a "political delegation" was required in Baghdad before a resumption could come about.

4. The Iraqis had made a parallel approach to the West Germans and on 25 February a delegation led by a senior government official, described to the Iraqis as the "Deputy" Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Baghdad. The resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries was announced on 28 February. The Germans told us in advance that they would only agree to substantive economic talks after a resumption of relations. This is reflected in the ensuing communiqués.

Argument

5. It would, I believe, be to our advantage to have full diplomatic relations with Iraq provided this can be arranged without detriment to our other interests. In brief, the reasons are as follows:

(a) Commercial. We have traditionally been the leading Western trading partner of the Iraqis and it is only in the past year that the French have overtaken us. Since the agreement between the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Iraq Government in February 1973, and the rise in oil prices, Iraq has become a much more attractive market and its long-term economic future seems secure.

/(b)

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(b) Oil. It is now estimated that Iraq could be second only to Saudi Arabia in the Middle East in terms of oil reserves.

(c) Our traditional contacts with Iraq in the fields of training and education would be encouraged by a resumption, and would increase Western influence to the possible containment of Soviet influence there; in this context, the Shah of Iran has said that he would welcome a resumption of UK/Iraq relations.

6. I recognise that in existing circumstances it may well prove impossible to send a delegation led by a Minister, although there is an obvious risk that any other than a Ministerial mission will be regarded unfavourably by the Iraqis in contrast with the West German response. Nevertheless, I believe that it is in our interests to respond, and to do so quickly. If the delegation is not to be led by a Minister then I consider that the leader should be someone whom the Iraqis will recognise and accept as an interlocuteur valable. A suitable choice would be Sir Harold Beeley, who, when British Ambassador in Cairo, negotiated the resumption of Anglo/Iraqi relations in 1968. If this is agreed, an official (perhaps myself) should accompany Sir Harold Beeley. If the Iraqis return to the subject of economic cooperation we should point to the COMET mission in the first instance and add that any further contacts should be explored after a resumption, much as the Germans seem to have done.

Recommendation

7. I therefore recommend that

(a) We should approach Sir Harold Beeley forthwith with a request that he act as leader of the "political delegation";


/(b)

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- (b) We should inform the Iraqis via the Chargé d'Affaires in Paris that Sir Harold Beeley and an FCO official would be ready to visit Baghdad as soon as possible to discuss the resumption of diplomatic relations; and
- (c) We should inform the US, the French, Iranian and Kuwaiti governments of our proposed course of action.



P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department

13 March 1974

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TRED  
FRD  
Energy Department  
POD  
PPD  
PUSD

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


M<sup>r</sup> Weir

239 (50)

Mr. Campbell

2) Private Secretary



Minister of State

Secretary of State.

25/3/74  
fe

RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ: DESPATCH OF AN EMISSARY TO BAGHDAD

1. The economic case for a resumption set out in Mr. Wright's submission is a strong one and I think we should act while the Iraqis are in a favourable mood (their original approach was made more than a month ago). I would not expect serious criticism from any quarter, though the Israelis might grumble. Dr. Kissinger said he thought a resumption a good idea when the possibility was mentioned to him on his last visit to London, and that the Iraqis seemed to be thinking of resuming relations with the United States too.
2. Like the Germans, we would of course decline to pay a price in advance. In any public announcement we would make it clear that in sending an emissary to Baghdad we were in fact responding to an initial overture from the Iraqis.

M<sup>r</sup> Weir

M S Weir  
15 March 1974

I agree.

Sir H. Bealey would be a good emissary and would I think be accepted by the Iraqis as an adequately prestigious leader of a delegation.

Sir Harold would be an admirable choice.  
I assumed we passed as proposed 16/3

Mr Campbell

15/3

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21/3  
Pa

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 155 OF 20 MARCH. 1974

YOUR TEL NO 97 PARA 1 D(I):  
ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

(10) NBP 3/248/7.

1. I BROUGHT THIS UP WITH THE SHAH AT MY AUDIENCE ON 19 MARCH (MYTEL NO 150). I SAID THAT, AS HE PROBABLY KNEW, THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED AN APPROACH FROM THE IRAQIS ABOUT A POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS. NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN AND THE PROBLEM WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN LONDON. I COULD NOT ANTICIPATE HMG'S DECISION, BUT I BELIEVED THAT OUR LINE OF THINKING MIGHT WELL BE THAT, PROVIDED THERE WERE NO STRINGS ATTACHED, WE WOULD SEE SOME ADVANTAGE IN HAVING AN EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD. WE WERE GAINING NOTHING FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION. HOWEVER, WE WOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WOULD ENABLE US TO WORK MIRACLES ON THE IRAQI REGIME.

2. THE SHAH SAID THAT HE WAS MUCH IN FAVOUR OF OUR RESUMING RELATIONS WITH BAGHDAD. WE WOULD GET BETTER INFORMATION AND WOULD BE ABLE TO WORK ON THE IRAQIS.

PARSONS

FILES  
M E D  
DEFENCE DEPT  
W O D  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR

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Mr. Weir


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## ISMAIL KHAIRULLA AND UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

Sir Harold Beeley told you on 19 March that he had some hesitations about undertaking a mission to Iraq, since the Acting Foreign Minister with whom he had negotiated the previous resumption had subsequently been sent to gaol. You may therefore like to have the following background notes on Mr. Khairulla.

2. Born in Baghdad in 1929, Khairulla graduated from law college in 1951, since which time he has practised intermittently. Described as a Nasserist lightweight, he was interned from time to time under the monarchy but after the 1958 revolution, little was heard of him politically until he was appointed Minister of State on 10 May 1967. On 10 July of the same year he was appointed Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in which capacity he negotiated a resumption of Anglo/Iraqi relations with Sir Harold Beeley. He lost his job after the July 1968 Ba'ath revolution and was gaoled in May 1969, allegedly for plotting against the Government. Nothing substantive has been heard of him since, although there were rumours in 1970 that he had been tried secretly and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for "espionage".

3. On the face of it, there is nothing to connect his subsequent fall from grace with the part he played in the resumption of Anglo/Iraqi relations.



P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department

21 March 1974

Since the above was typed, Mr. Campbell has told me that the Permanent Under-Secretary has also expressed interest in the idea of Sir Donald Maitland leading the mission rather than Sir Harold Beeley. Mr. Campbell has therefore asked that no action should be taken on my submission (which the Secretary of State has now approved) until there has been further discussion with him.

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Secretary of State (53)

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Mr. Jones  
Mr. Weir

PWS

Private Secretary

Secretary

Says

I have discussed with the Clerk, who supports the recommendation.

I support this recommendation. M.J. Weir

I am considering whether to suggest to the Sups that I should do a middle east tour in the summer, and it would be for consideration, in the event, whether I should add Iraq to the countries to visit.

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

Flag A

As you know, the Secretary of State agreed on 20 March to the recommendation in my submission of 13 March that we should approach Sir Harold Beeley with a request that he act as leader of a "political delegation" to discuss a resumption of diplomatic relations with the Iraqis. This has been discussed with Sir Harold who expressed some reservations about undertaking this task, primarily because the Acting Foreign Minister with whom he negotiated the previous resumption has spent most of the time since then in gaol and Sir Harold therefore doubts whether it would be appropriate for him to undertake the same mission again.

2. In the circumstances, the Permanent Under-Secretary has suggested that Sir Donald Maitland might undertake the mission to Baghdad. I understand that tentative soundings have revealed that Sir Donald would be able to visit Baghdad on 9 April and I therefore recommend that a telegram on the lines of the attached draft be sent to Paris.

3. I also recommend that the telegram be copied to other posts and that H.M. Ambassadors in Washington, Paris, Tehran and Kuwait should be authorised to inform the governments to which they are accredited in accordance with recommendation (C) in my earlier submission. Similar action should be taken in Stockholm.

Mr. Williams

Mr. Clark

Mr. Wright

To see the Minister of State's comments

25 March 1974

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P.R.H. Wright  
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1974  
TO PRIORITY PARIS TELNO 153 OF 28 MARCH INFO BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, BONN, INFO SAVING ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, JEDDA, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV. YOUR TELNO 218 (NOT TO ALL) AND MY TELNO 27 TO BAGHDAD: UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. THE IRAQI MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERIOR, RECENTLY IN LONDON ON PRIVATE VISITS, EMPHASISED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR A QUOTE POLITICAL DELEGATION UNQUOTE TO VISIT BAGHDAD BEFORE A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS COULD BE ARRANGED. I HAVE AGREED THAT SIR DONALD MAITLAND SHOULD VISIT BAGHDAD FOR THIS PURPOSE.
2. PLEASE THEREFORE ARRANGE FOR AN ORAL RESPONSE TO BE CONVEYED TO THE IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.
3. I HAVE NOW HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER THE IRAQI SUGGESTION THAT TALKS SHOULD BE HELD IN BAGHDAD WITH A VIEW TO RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. I WELCOME THE PROSPECT OF A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND PROPOSE THAT SIR DONALD MAITLAND, A SENIOR OFFICIAL IN THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AND LATELY U.K. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N., SHOULD VISIT BAGHDAD FOR THIS PURPOSE. SIR DONALD WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO TRAVEL ON OR ABOUT 9 APRIL. I WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT.
4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, WE DO NOT (NOT) PROPOSE TO SEND ANY QUOTE ECONOMISTS UNQUOTE WITH SIR DONALD (YOUR TELNO 179, NOT TO ALL). IF QUESTIONED ON THIS, YOU SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT THE COMET MISSION IN FEBRUARY WAS WELCOMED BY THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT TO DISCUSS FUTURE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION, AND THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC MATTERS SHOULD FOLLOW A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS.
5. YOU AND H.M. AMBASSADORS IN TEHRAN, KUWAIT, STOCKHOLM AND WASHINGTON HAVE DISCRETION, ON RECEIPT OF CONFIRMATION FROM PARIS THAT THE PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE IRAQIS, TO INFORM IN CONFIDENCE THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 406 FO 29 MARCH INFO ROUTINE BAGHAD, TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, JEDDA, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DUBAI.

YOUR TEL NO 153: UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY TOOK ACTION THIS AFTERNOON WITH IRAQI CHARGES D'AFFAIRES, WHO SAID THAT HE WOULD TRANSMIT THE MESSAGE TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND LET US HAVE A REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WALI ASKED WHETHER SIR DONALD MAITLAND WOULD HAVE FULL AUTHORITY TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT OR WOULD MERELY BE ABLE TO EXPLORE THE GROUND. HE COULD NOT HELP FEELING THAT THINGS WERE GOING RATHER SLOWLY; THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN PARIS HAD STARTED EXCHANGES WITH THE GERMANS AT THE SAME TIME AS OURSELVES AND IT WAS NOW OVER TWO WEEKS SINCE THE GERMANS HAD RESUMED RELATIONS. LEAHY SAID THAT HE THOUGHT SIR DONALD'S PURPOSE IN VISITING BAGHAD WOULD BE TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR RESUMING RELATIONS BUT THAT THE RESULTS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AD REFERENDUM.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM STOCKHOLM 291415Z

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1974

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 57 OF 29 MARCH/INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD AND PARIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 153 TO PARIS: UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. IT WOULD BE COURTEOUS TO TELL THE SWEDS NOW IN CONFIDENCE OF THE PROPOSAL BEING MADE TO THE IRAQIS THROUGH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PARIS. MAY I HAVE AUTHORITY TO DO SO IN ADVANCE OF THE IRAQI REPLY? THE SWEDS MAY OTHERWISE HEAR OF IT FROM THE IRAQIS.

MILLARD

RSB 8/4  
pa

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(56)

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TO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM TELNO 20 OF 29 MARCH INFO BAGHDAD AND PARIS.

YOUR TEL NO 57 : UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

YES , BUT PLEASE STRESS CONFIDENTIALITY.

CALLAGHAN

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MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR  
MR WIGGIN

RSB 8/4  
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
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(57)

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 60 OF 1 APRIL 1974 INFO BAGHDAD AND PARIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 20: UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. WE HAVE INFORMED SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN  
CONFIDENCE OF PROPOSAL THAT SIR D. MAITLAND SHOULD VISIT BAGHDAD,  
AND ALSO OF THE IRAQI REACTION REPORTED IN BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 96.

MILLARD

F I L E S

MED

WED

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

MR WIGGIN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

DESKBY 011000Z APR.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 096 OF 01 APRIL 1974.  
INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS, TEHRAN, STOCKHOLM, KUWAIT,  
WASHINGTON, BONN AND SAVING TO ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN,  
MUSCAT, JEDDA, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, ANKARA.

25/548/1  
ja

YOUR TEL NO 153 TO PARIS : UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. SD SHADHIL TAQA (MFA U/SECY) CALLED ME TO HIS OFFICE 6 PM 31 MARCH.
2. REFERRING TO A RECENT CONVERSATION BETWEEN MICHAEL WEIR AND TALIB SHABIB (IRAQ'S UN DELEGATE) IN LONDON ABOUT A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS HE SAID THAT THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY SIR DONALD MAITLAND IN THE FIRST DAYS OF APRIL.
3. TAQA PRAISED BRITAIN'S WISE AND OBJECTIVE ATTITUDE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DURING MEETINGS ON IRAQ/IRAN CLASHES AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATES VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. IRAQ WISHED THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT WELL.

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/4. HE



4. HE SAID THAT OUR COUNTRIES HAD MUTUAL INTERESTS. FOR HER PART IRAQ NEEDED SOPHISTICATED MODERN TECHNOLOGY WHILE BRITAIN NEEDED RAW MATERIALS AND ENERGY RESOURCES. THERE WERE OLD HISTORICAL LINKS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND IRAQ AND THE TIME WAS RIGHT FOR A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS FOR THE BENEFIT OF BOTH COUNTRIES. IRAQ BELIEVED THAT EUROPE HAD TO BE EUROPEAN AND THE ARABS ARAB. THEY DID NOT HAVE IN MIND ANY PRE-CONDITIONS FOR A RESUMPTION.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSES.

MCCLUNEY

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 097 OF 01 APRIL 1974, INFORMATION  
PRIORITY PARIS, BONN.

59  
UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

MY TEL NO 096 PARA 2 : TIMING.

25/8/74  
pa

1. SD TAQA SAID THEY WOULD WELCOME SIR DONALD AT ANY TIME. I SUGGESTED 9 APRIL AS A CONVENIENT DAY. HE REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD BE FAIRLY BUSY ON 8 AND 9 APRIL AND WEIR HAD INDICATED AN EARLIER DATE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.
2. TAQA ALSO SAID THEY HOPED THE TEAM COULD INCLUDE SOMEONE TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL MATTERS. I REPLIED ON THE LINES OF PARA 4 YOUR TEL NO 153 TO PARIS. TAQA SAID IT WOULD NEVER THE LESS BE HELPFUL IF SOMEONE COULD COME TO TAKE NOTE OF ECONOMIC NEEDS, PROSPECTS AND PROJECTS. THEY DID NOT WISH TO ARRANGE AN AGREEMENT OF ANY KIND AT THIS STAGE, BUT, ON THE WEST GERMAN LINES WISHED TO AGREE TO HAVE TALKS ABOUT ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION LATER.
3. HE DID NOT SEE OUR TALKS ON THIS OCCASION TAKING VERY LONG. THEY HAD IN MIND THE WEST GERMAN PATTERN (AND WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO RESUME WITH US FIRST HAD ELECTIONS NOT PREVENTED THIS). AS YOU KNOW THE GERMAN TEAM WERE HERE FOR THREE DAYS.
4. TAQA DID NOT AT ANY TIME REFER TO THE EXCHANGES IN PARIS.



5. AS A PARTING SHOT THE U/SECY PROMISED THAT VISAS WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT THE AIRPORT FOR SIR DONALD AND HIS TEAM.

6. I HAVE INFORMED THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR OF OUR PROPOSAL AND THE IRAQI REPLY.

MCCLUNEY

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


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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 098 OF 1 APRIL. 1974.

MY TEL NO 096 UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

SINCE WE DO NOT HAVE A BAG WHICH WILL GIVE  
YOU A FULL RECORD OF MY CONVERSATION WITH TAQA  
31 MARCH IN TIME TO BE USEFUL, I AM SENDING BY  
ROUTINE TELEGRAM TODAY.

MCCLUNEY

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 99 OF 1 APRIL, 1974.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SD SHADHIL TAQA AND  
MR I MCCLUNEY IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BAGHDAD  
ON 31 MARCH 1974 AT 6 P.M.

PRESENT

SD SHADHIL TAQA  
UNDER SECRETARY OF  
STATE FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS, IRAQ.

IAN MCCLUNEY  
2ND SECRETARY  
BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION,  
ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY.

MISS SALIMA BAKR  
DIRECTOR, PROXKCOL.

SD SHADHIL TAQA

SAID THAT SD TALIB SHABIB ( IRAQS UN DELEGATE) HAD AN  
OPPORTUNITY TO TALK RECENTLY TO MR MICHAEL WEIR IN LONDON  
ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ  
AND BRITAIN. MR WEIR HAD TOLD HIM THAT SIR DONALD MAITLAND  
WAS AVAILABLE TO VISIT IRAQ TO DISCUSS THIS.

BRITAINS ATTITUDE

CONFIDENTIAL

/2.SD TAQA



2. SD TAQA  
-----

SAID THAT THEY HAD THOUGHT BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE IN THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL EXCHANGED DURING THE IRAQ/IRAN BORDER CLASHES WAS OBJECTIVE AND WISE. BRITAIN HAD SHOWN A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM AND HAD MADE A SPECIAL EVALUATION OF THE BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDE OF THE IRANIAN REPRESENTATIVE DURING THIS PERIOD. THEY WERE PLEASED ABOUT THIS.

3. IRAQ HAD FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST MR CALLAGHAN'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND APPRECIATED HIS ATTITUDE. THEY HAD NOTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT STATEMENTS BEFORE THE ELECTION BUT WISHED THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT WELL. THEY HOPED MR WILSON WILL CONTINUE TO HANDLE BRITAIN'S AFFAIRS AND THAT IN MATTERS OF MIDDLE EAST HE WOULD SPEAK ON THE SAME LINES AS THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.

RELATIONS.

4. SD TAQA  
-----

SAID THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAD MUTUAL INTERESTS. FOR IRAQ'S PART THEY NEEDED SOPHISTICATED MODERN TECHNOLOGY. BRITAIN NEEDED RAW MATERIALS AND ENERGY RESOURCES. BRITAIN COULD GAIN CONTRACTS HERE WHICH MIGHT HELP OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS SO FAR AS IRAQ IN ITS SMALL WAY WAS ABLE. IRAQ BELIEVED THAT EUROPE HAD TO BE EUROPEAN AND THE ARABS, ARAB. IT WAS NATURAL FOR EACH TO HAVE THEIR OWN IDENTITY. THERE WERE OLD HISTORIC RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND IRAQ. THE TIME WAS RIGHT FOR A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS FOR THE BENEFIT OF BOTH COUNTRIES. THEY DID NOT HAVE IT IN MIND TO LAY DOWN ANY PRE-CONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION. THEY HOPE FOR AN EARLY RESPONSE TO THEIR INITIATIVE.

5. ACCORDINGLY IRAQ WOULD BE PLEASED TO RECEIVE SIR DONALD MAITLAND AT ANY TIME CONVENIENT TO HIM, MICHAEL WEIR HAD MENTIONED THAT HE WOULD BE FREE IN THE FIRST DAYS OF APRIL.  
MR MCCLUNEY  
-----



SUGGESTED THAT THE 9TH OF APRIL MIGHT BE CONVENIENT DAY.

SD TAQA

REPLIED THAT THEY EXPECTED TO BE FAIRLY BUSY ON THE 8TH AND 9TH AND WOULD PREFER THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE MONTH. HOWEVER THEY WOULD WELCOME SIR DONALD ANY TIME. THEY HOPED THAT IN HIS TEAM HE WOULD BRING SOMEONE WHO COULD DEAL WITH ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL MATTERS.

MR MCCLUNEY

SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT SIR DONALD TO BE ACCOMPANIED ON THIS OCCASION BY AN ECONOMIST SINCE THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT HAD RECENTLY WELCOMED THE COMET MISSION. HE THOUGHT THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC MATTERS COULD FOLLOW A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS.

SD TAQA

REPLIED THAT IRAQ CERTAINLY DID NOT HAVE IT IN MIND TO REACH ANY ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN AT THIS STAGE, BUT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THERE WERE SOMEONE WHO COULD TAKE A NOTE OF THE PROJECTS AND NEEDS IN IRAQ AND IF A STATEMENT COULD BE MADE ON THE LINES OF THE WEST GERMAN COMMUNIQUE ABOUT A PURPOSE OF THE VISIT BEING TO CONSOLIDATE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

6. SD TAQA

SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK OUR TALKS DURING SIR DONALD'S VISIT WOULD TAKE VERY LONG. THE IRAQI SIDE HAD IN MIND THE GERMAN PATTERN AND INDEED WISHED THAT THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO RESUME FIRST WITH US, THOUGH OUR ELECTIONS HAD PREVENTED THIS.

7. IN MORE RELAXED CONVERSATION AFTER THE FORMAL STATEMENT  
SD TAQA

MADE THE POINT THAT IRAQ HAD ASKED FOR A MINISTER BUT WOULD WELCOME SIR DONALD SINCE THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT CLEARLY NEEDED ALL ITS MEMBERS AVAILABLE IN LONDON.

MR MCCLUNEY



POINTED OUT THAT SIR DONALDS POST AT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS OF MINISTERIAL RANK, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD APPOINTED A MINISTER AS UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE.

8. IN A LIGHT HEARTED EXCHANGE ON VISAS  
SD TAQA  
-----

PROMISED THAT VISAS WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT THE AIRPORT FOR SIR DONALD AND HIS TEAM, AND  
MISS BAKR  
-----

EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD SOON BE RID OF THIS PROBLEM OF DELAY IN THE ISSUE OF VISAS FOR UK.

9. MR MCCLUNEY  
-----

THANKED SD TAQA FOR HIS WELCOME INVITATION TO SIR DONALD AND FOR HIS FORTH-COMING STATEMENT. HE AGREED TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND TO CONVEY A REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

MCCLUNEY

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CYPHER CAT A

FM PARIS 021540Z

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 420 OF 02 APRIL<sup>74</sup>/INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 97 TO FCO: UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED AT HIS OWN REQUEST IN ORDER TO DELIVER THE SAME MESSAGE AS THAT CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF T.U.R.
2. I EXPLAINED THAT I DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE PRACTICABLE FOR SIR DONALD MAITLAND TO GO TO BAGHDAD EARLIER THAN APRIL 9 SINCE HE WAS AT PRESENT ON THE HIGH SEAS AND WOULD HAVE TO GO TO LONDON FOR BRIEFING BEFORE GOING TO BAGHDAD. BUT I UNDERTOOK TO PASS THE MESSAGE TO YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DID NOT REFER TO TAQA'S DEMARCHE IN BAGHDAD AND SEEMS TO BE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HANDLING THIS QUESTION. I FEEL THEREFORE THAT AS A MATTER OF COURTESY I SHOULD RESPOND TO HIS APPROACH. MAY I TELL HIM THAT SIR DONALD MAITLAND CANNOT ALTER HIS DATES AND THAT HE WILL NOT BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ADVISOR?

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TO IMMEDIATE SS 'MICHELANGELO' TEL UNNUMBERED OF 2 APRIL, 1974

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING URGENT TELEGRAM TO:

SIR DONALD MAITLAND

SS MICHELANGELO

CABIN U.74



PERSONAL FROM WEIR

1. YOUR VISIT HAS BEEN AGREED, AND OMENS ARE FAVOURABLE.

DESPITE PRESSURE FOR AN EARLIER DATE WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT YOU SHOULD TRAVEL ON 9 APRIL AND DEPART AT MIDDAY ON 11 APRIL. WE HAVE SAID THAT IF THIS TIMING IS UNACCEPTABLE THE VISIT WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER EASTER.

2. AS TO SUPPORTING CAST I AM AFRAID THAT PATRICK WRIGHT HAD ALREADY MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE AWAY OVER THIS PERIOD. I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ASK HIM TO CANCEL THEM UNLESS YOU REGARD HIS PRESENCE AS INDISPENSABLE. I WOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD THAT YOU BE ACCOMPANIED BY GRAHAM BURTON THE APPROPRIATE DESK OFFICER WHO HAS AS MUCH BACKGROUND AS ANYONE HERE, PLUS GARDINER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE. I HOPE YOU CAN ACCEPT THIS. UNLESS YOU TELEGRAPH TO THE CONTRARY WE WILL PLAN ACCORDINGLY.

CALLAGHAN

FILES:

MED

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TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 57 OF 2 APRIL/74 INFO PARIS, STOCKHOLM,  
TEHRAN, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON AND BONN.  
YOUR TELNO 97: UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.



1. SIR DONALD MAITLAND WILL NOT ARRIVE IN THE UK ON HIS RETURN FROM NEW YORK UNTIL 6 APRIL AND IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO LEAVE FOR BAGHDAD UNTIL 9 APRIL. PLEASE THEREFORE TELL THE IRAQIS THIS AND SAY THAT UNLESS THIS IS INCONVENIENT THE DELEGATION WILL ARRIVE ON FLIGHT IA 034 AT 21.10 ON 9 APRIL. THE TEAM, WHICH WILL INCLUDE A MEMBER OF MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT AND AN OFFICIAL FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE (YOUR PARA 2), WHOSE NAMES WILL FOLLOW, COULD THEN DEPART BY FLIGHT BA 771 AT 12.05 ON THURSDAY 11 APRIL. IN VIEW OF THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE I HOPE THIS WILL LEAVE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS TO BE NEGOTIATED. AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED AN ANNOUNCEMENT COULD BE MADE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.

2. IF THE IRAQIS ARE UNABLE TO ACCEPT THIS TIMING, YOU SHOULD TELL THEM THAT THE DELEGATION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TRAVEL UNTIL AFTER THE EASTER HOLIDAYS.

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
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DESKBY 031000Z APR.



TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 102 OF 03 APRIL 1974.

INFORMATION IMMEDIATE PARIS, STOCKHOLM, TEHRAN, KUWAIT  
WASHINGTON AND BONN.

YOUR TEL NO 057 : UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

*18/4  
ja*

1. MFA U/SECY SD TAQA THIS MORNING AGREED THAT  
SIR DONALD MAITLAND SHOULD COME TO BAGHDAD WITH THE  
TEAM YOU SUGGEST ON 9 APRIL.

2. DETAILS IN MIFT (FCO ONLY).

MCCLUNEY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

DESKBY 031030Z APR.

(65)

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 103 OF 03 APRIL 1974.

YOUR TEL NO 057 UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. I DISCUSSED SIR DONALDS VISIT WITH MFA U/SECY TAQA AT 10.00 AM TODAY. THEY ARE HAPPY FOR DELEGATION TO ARRIVE 1A034 ETA 21.10 APRIL 9. INITIALLY HE FELT TO LEAVE 11 APRIL MADE THE VISIT RATHER SHORT BUT I EXPLAINED THAT 12 APRIL WAS GOOD FRIDAY AS WELL AS NORMAL HOLIDAY HERE AND HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS. (THEY THOUGHT APPROPRIATE THE GESTURE OF ARRIVING IRAQI AIRWAYS AND LEAVING BRITISH AIRWAYS).

2. ACCOMMODATION : MFA HAVE BOOKED SUITE FOR SIR DONALD AND FOUR OTHER ROOMS IN BAGHDAD HOTEL. THE PARTY WILL BE GUESTS OF IRAQ GOVERNMENT.

3. SCOPE OF TALKS : AS THE VISIT WILL BE SHORT SD TAQS SUGGESTED WE LOOK AT THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ON RESUPTION, FOR SIMILTANEOUS PUBLICATION IN BAGHDAD AND LONDON, BEFORE THE DELEGATION ARRIVE. IF THIS COULD BE DONE DISCUSSIONS HERE DURING THE VISIT, CAN BE FAIRLY GENERAL. THEY WILL PROPOSE A DRAFT LATER TODAY. THE IRAQIS HAVE IN MIND FOLLOWING SUBJECTS FOR TALKS.

- A) RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS.
- B) EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.
- C) SITUATION IN THE (MIDDLE EAST ?) AREA- BRITISH VIEW AND EVALUATION - IRAQS ANALYSIS.
- D) ANY SUBJECTS SIR DONALD MAY WISH TO RAISE.

THEY DO NOT HINK IT NECESSARY TO SIGN IN PRIVATE AN AGREED MINUTE.

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4. IF SIR DONALD WOULD LIKE TO SEE SIGHTS OF BAGHDAD/IRAQ OR PURSUE HOBBIES HERE, MFA WILL ARRANGE. I INDICATED THAT MOST OF 10 APRIL MIGHT BE TAKEN UP IN TALKS.

5. SD TAQA THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR SIR DONALD TO SEE SOMEONE OF "HIGHER AUTHORITY". LATER MISS BAKR ASKED WHO HE MIGHT WISH TO SEE APART FROM TAQA HIMSELF. I SUGGESTED THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUT SHE SEEMED TO THINK THIS UNLIKELY. (THIS COULD BE INTERNAL POLITICS RATHER THAN A SNUB).

6. MISS BAKR AGVE THE IMPRESSION MFA MAY OFFER ENTERTAINMENT ON EVENING 10 APRIL.

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(67)

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 105 OF 03 APRIL 1974.

MY TEL NO 103 UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

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- 3 APR 1974  
NBR 25/248/1

25/248/1  
25/248/1

1. DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT
  - A) ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DELEGATION E.G.  
SECURITY, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.
  - B) HOW TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
2. I BELIEVE WE HAVE THE CAPACITY TO OPERATE AD HOC BUT  
IF THERE ARE ANY SPECIAL POINTS OF ADMINISTRATION TO COVER  
IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW OF THEM IN ADVANCE.

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FM BAGHDAD 03135Z APR.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DESKBY 031500Z APR.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 106 OF 3 APRIL 1974.

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS : TALKS.

MY TEL NO 103 PARA 3.

1. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF LESS GENERAL SUBJECTS THAT COULD COME UP ON THIS OCCASION - THOUGH YOU MAY THINK IT BETTER TO RESUME RELATIONS AND DISCUSS THEM LATER.
2. THE IRAQIS ARE ALMOST BOUND TO MENTION VISA DELAYS AT SOME STAGE.
3. WE REALLY OUGHT TO BRING UP BOB ELLIS'S CONTINUED DETENTION EITHER DURING TALKS OR SIMULTANEOUSLY AT CONSULAR LEVEL. (MY TEL DITRESS 016 OF 3 APRIL).
4. WE MIGHT DEAL SIMILARLY WITH PROBLEM OF THE EXPULSION OF OUR INDIAN STAFF. (MY LETTER 93/9 OF 24 MARCH TO YOUNG PSD).
5. A NICE GESTURE ON OUR PART WOULD BE SOME PROPOSAL ON LAND FOR IDELTI, THOUGH MFA MAY NEED A PRE-HINT OF THE SUBJECT IN CASE THEY ARE UNBRIEFED. (MY LETTER TO BRASNETT, ACCOM AND SERVICES DEPT. 90F13 JANUARY REFERS).

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FM FCO 031040Z

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TO PRIORITY PARIS TELNO 160 OF 3 APRIL. 1974

YOUR TELNO 420: UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

- (6) 1. YOU SHOULD SPEAK TO THE IRAQI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON THE LINES  
OF MY TELNO 57 TO BAGHDAD.

CALLAGHAN

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FM BAGHDAD 031405Z April

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DESKBY 031530Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 107 OF 3 APRIL 1974

MY TELNO 103 PARA 3. UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MFA TRANSLATION OF PROPOSED STATEMENT  
ON RESUMPTION.

BEGINS

'IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMON DESIRE OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AND BRITAIN TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC  
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND IN ORDER  
TO CONSOLIDATE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION  
BETWEEN THEM, A DELEGATION REPRESENTING THE BRITISH  
GOVERNMENT AND HEADED BY SIR DONALD MAITLAND, UNDER  
SECRETARY AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE VISITED THE REPUBLIC OF  
IRAQ FROM 9 APRIL TO ..... APRIL.

AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH THE BRITISH  
DELEGATION CARRIED OUT WITH THE COMPETENT IRAQI  
AUTHORITIES, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREED TO RESUME  
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AT  
AMBASSADOR LEVEL WITH EFFECT FROM ..... AND TO  
CONSOLIDATE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN  
THE TWO COUNTRIES.

UNTIL AMBASSADORS ARE APPOINTED, THE HEADS OF  
THE INTERESTS SECTIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL  
ACT TEMPORARILY AS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THEIR EMBASSIES'.

ENDS.

MCCLUNEY

BT

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
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FM KUWAIT 040800Z APR

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 274 OF 4 APRIL 1974


UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

54 MY FIRST SECRETARY, JUST BACK FROM BAHRAIN, REPORTS HM  
AMBASSADOR UNAWARE OF THIS DEVELOPEMENT AND DUE TO SEE RULER OF  
BAHRAIN ON SATURDAY. I SHALL BE SPEAKING TO PUS ON LINES OF YOUR  
TELNO 153 TO PARIS AT 1000 HRS THIS MORNING. I SHALL SPEAK IN  
CONFIDENCE BUT THE MFA LEAKS LIKE A SIEVE AND THE RULER OF BAHRAIN  
MAY WELL HEAR A GARBLED VERSION BEFORE VERY LONG. I THINK IT  
WOULD BE USEFUL IF YOU WERE TO REPEAT THE KEY TELS OT BAHRAIN  
( AND OTHER GULF POSTS) URGENTLY.

WILTON

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MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR

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FROM KUWAIT 040945Z APRIL

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 276 OF 4 APRIL 1974

REPEATED TO ROUTINE ABU DHABI , DUBAI , BAHRAIN , MUSCAT , JEDDA  
BAGHDAD SAVING TEHRAN , WASHINGTON , CAIRO , DAMASCUS , BEIRUT  
AND TEL AVIV

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YOUR TEL 153 TO PARIS: UK - IRAQ RELATIONS.

I INFORMED THE PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY AT THE  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CONFIDENCE THIS MORNING ABOUT  
SIR D MAITLAND'S IMPENDING VISIT TO BAGHDAD TO SEE WHETHER  
A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS COULD BE NEGOTIATED.  
RASHID'S ONLY COMMENT WAS TO REPEAT THE WELL WORN LINE THAT  
KUWAIT TOOK THE VIEW THAT IT WAS BETTER TO HAVE RELATIONS  
THAN NOT, ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE WERE DIFFICULT ISSUES TO  
DISCUSS. I CONCURRED.  
FCO PAS SAVING ADDRESSEES


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TO ROUTINE BAHRAIN TELNO 60 OF 4 APR/AND TO ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA  
MUSCAT JEDDA INFO STOCKHOLM KUWAIT WASHINGTON TEHRAN PARIS BONN  
BAGHDAD CAIRO DAMASCUS BEIRUT TEL-AVIV.

MY TELNO 153 TO PARIS (NOT REPEATED TO DOHA IN ERROR):  
UK/IRAQ RELATIONS


1. AT THE INVITATION OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, SIR DONALD MAITLAND WILL LEAD A SMALL DELEGATION TO BAGHDAD ON 9 APRIL TO NEGOTIATE A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE IRAQIS HAVE ALREADY SUBMITTED A PROPOSED DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WHICH SEEMS UNEXCEPTIONABLE. SUBJECT TO THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS IN BAGHDAD, THE COMMUNIQUE, ANNOUNCING A RESUMPTION, WILL PROBABLY BE ISSUED ON 11 APRIL.
2. ADDRESSEES HAVE DISCRETION TO INFORM THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED IN CONFIDENCE THAT SIR DONALD WILL BE VISITING BAGHDAD AT THE REQUEST OF THE IRAQIS TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

CALLAGHAN

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MR WIGGIN  
MR CARTER  
MR HANKEY





Enter pa 75

28 9/4

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Mr. Weir *Disputed with Sir D. Maitland.*

*now 9/4*

*Mr. Williams 9/4*

*28 9/4*

RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ: STEERING BRIEF FOR SIR DONALD MAITLAND'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD ON 9 APRIL

(62) Diplomatic relations were broken by the Iraqis in December 1971 because of our alleged collusion with the Iranians over the seizure of the Tunb Islands. In February this year, the Iraqis suggested through H.M. Ambassador, Paris, that a Ministerial delegation should visit Baghdad for talks on a possible resumption. A similar approach was made to West Germany, who responded quickly and resumed on 28 February. Our own response was delayed by the General Election and Ministers' preoccupations with domestic issues. However, on 28 March the Secretary of State agreed that we should propose to the Iraqis that a delegation led by Sir D. Maitland should visit Baghdad as soon as possible. The Iraqis welcomed the proposal in warm terms (Baghdad telegram No. 99 - Annex A).

(71) 2. If the attitude the Iraqis have adopted so far is maintained, the talks on the resumption should be straightforward and agreement reached quickly. Negotiations will probably be conducted with Sayed Shadhil Taqa, the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about whom we know little. The Iraqis have already proposed a text for the Communiqué (Annex B) which we can accept, subject to the deletion of the word "temporarily" in the last line. We should propose that the resumption take effect from 11 April and that the Communiqué is released at News Department's 12.30 press briefing on the same day. If the Iraqis issue an announcement simultaneously (i.e. 2.30 p.m. Baghdad local time) it would follow neatly upon the delegation's departure at 12.05. If questioned beforehand about the reasons for the visit, News Department will say that the delegation has gone to Baghdad for discussions on a possible resumption of diplomatic relations.

3. The Iraqis have proposed the following subjects for talks:

A. Resumption of Relations. See paragraph 2 above.

*att 2.* B. Possibility of Economic and Technical Cooperation between our two countries. We have told the Iraqis that any discussion of future economic cooperation must follow a resumption. We have, however, agreed "to take note of their economic needs, prospects and projects" and have therefore asked Mr. Gardiner of the Department of Trade to be included in the delegation. He has supplied an economic brief (Annex C).

C. Situation in the Area. We should concentrate on our attitude towards the Arab/Israel dispute which we know the Iraqis approve. For obvious reasons, we should try not to be drawn into detailed

/discussions

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attd. discussions of our policies elsewhere in the area at this stage. A short list of subjects with lines to take is however attached (Annex D).

attd. D. Subjects we may raise. There are two matters we may raise if the atmosphere is suitable. Short briefs are attached (Annex E), which can be discussed further with Mr. McCluney.

attd. 4. The Iraqis will almost certainly raise the question of UK visas for Iraqi nationals. They may also raise defence sales and military training. A brief on the former and line to take on the latter are at Annex F.

attd. 5. I also attach a short background brief on Iraq (Annex G) and a draft programme (so far as we know it) with administrative arrangements (Annex H).



P.R.H. Wright  
Middle East Department

5 April 1974

Copies to: Sir D. Maitland  
Mr. Clark  
Mr. Burton (2 sets)

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ANNEX C

VISIT OF SIR DONALD MAITLAND TO BAGHDAD 9-11 APRIL 1974  
ECONOMIC/TRADE BRIEF

Annex I - General

II - Quarterly economic report Jan/March 1974

III - Projects

IV - Recent agreements with India, Spain and Japan

V - Report of COMET Mission, February 1974

VI - Oil

VII - ECGD

VIII - UK trade with Middle East 1972/3

CRE 4  
Department of Trade  
4 April 1974





## UK/IRAQI TRADE

### ECONOMY

Iraq, though primarily an agricultural country, owes most of her economic development to her oil industry. Oil accounts for four fifths of the country's foreign exchange receipts, two thirds of total Government revenue and one fifth of the Gross National Product. Manufacturing industry, excluding oil, is directed toward import substitution. Textiles and construction materials are the most important items. Farming is the highest source of employment and Iraq is the world's largest exporter of dates, which are her most important crop. It is Government policy to protect home industries and there is an extensive list of prohibited imports aimed principally at fostering domestic industrial development. The protected industries include the production of mineral waters and carbonated drinks, biscuits, beer, edible oils, toilet and washing soaps and detergents. In anticipation of increased oil revenues, the allocations for expenditure in the 1970-74 Development Plan have been increased from ID 537 million to nearly ID 1000 million. Provisional allocations are 41 per cent for agriculture and 35 per cent for industry, the remainder being divided between transport, communications, housing and other construction.

### IMPORT POLICY

Iraq's protective import policy, including prohibitions, quotas and high tariffs has an inhibiting effect upon trade expansion.

Nationalisation in Iraq began in 1964 and has gradually become more and more extensive. The shares of US, Dutch and Portuguese companies in the Basra Petroleum Company have been nationalised as were British shares in the Iraq Petroleum Company.

The share of import allocation to the public sector has steadily increased and some 150 import items are now wholly restricted to this sector.

Under Law No 208 issued on 24 December 1969, importing and the operation of agencies is restricted to Iraqi nationals and, provided they fulfil certain conditions, to subjects of Arab States.

### UK TRADE WITH IRAQ

Our imports from Iraq consist chiefly of oil; recent figures are as follows:- (the drop in 1970 is the result of the effects of the dispute between the Iraqi Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company)

UK imports from Iraq (£ million)

1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
23.2	25.8	31.1	18.7	36.8	34.1	30.7

Our exports to Iraq consist mainly of manufactured goods (especially machinery) and chemicals; figures for recent years are as follows:-





UK exports to Iraq (£ million)

1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
16.7	15.6	21.3	23.8	24.8	26.8	27.0

Source: UK Trade Statistics

TRADE PROSPECTS

Iraq is still a changing and expanding market. The additional oil revenues which will accrue as a result of new price agreements and nationalisation will considerably increase Iraq's purchasing power but we shall have to meet increased competition from Japan and Western Europe. It is understood that the USSR are to undertake new development projects and several important contracts were awarded to foreign companies in the latter half of 1973.

The current break in diplomatic relations does not seem to have adversely affected our commercial relations with Iraq and the British Commercial Interests Section, operating under the protection of the Royal Swedish Embassy, has been able to maintain contact and good relations with the State trading organisations and the Government departments.

March, 1974.



IRAQQUARTERLY ECONOMIC REPORT FOR JANUARY-MARCH 1974Rate of Exchange I.D.0.696=£1

Increased oil prices decreed by the OPEC Ministerial Meeting in Tehran in December, along with rising oil production, quadrupled Iraq's estimated foreign exchange earnings, from about I.D. 400m last year to I.D. 1600m for 1974. An oil policy statement made by Dr. Hammadi the Minister of Oil, forecasts further increasing production of crude from the present level of 2.1m barrels a day to 3.5m barrels a day in 1975. At present prices this would bring Iraq about I.D.2,600.

The Minister of Planning, Dr. Jewad Hashem, announced the largest ever Annual Investment Programme, ID 800m for the 1974/75 financial year, compared with ID 296m for the previous year. The Import Programme for 1974/75 was also announced, and at ID 1,134m it was almost triple the allocations for the previous financial year.

Numerous official delegations and trade missions visited Iraq during the quarter. Most notable were the Japanese delegation led by Mr. Nakasone, Minister of Trade and Industry, which offered Iraq a credit of 1000m U.S. dollars for the implementation of oil and industrial projects, against an assured supply of oil; and the visit of M. Jobert, the French foreign Minister, which was followed by a large French trade mission and an official delegation. The latter signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with the Iraqi government, and accorded it a loan of 500m U.S. dollars for the financing of development projects. A small exploratory British trade mission from the Committee for Middle East Trade also visited Baghdad and were well received.

Contracts were placed with the Swiss firm of Sulzer for the extension of the Basra paper mill, worth about ID 26m, and with Japanese and Swedish shipbuilders for the supply of several large oil tankers. A US company was awarded the contract for a glass bottle factory at Ramadi. A Law on the Implementation of Major Projects was promulgated, with the object of speeding development. It allows exemptions from taxes, customs duties, import restrictions and labour laws.

Cost of living allowances for government employees were raised in February, and some consumer taxes were reduced.

BIS  
Baghdad  
31 March 1974





## IRAQ

## RECENT MAJOR PROJECTS

Oil Projects

The major contracts signed by the Iraqi authorities since the IPC settlement have been in this field and include the following:-

- (a) Strategic Pipeline - Haditha to Rumaila. This pipeline is designed to operate in both directions i.e. by bringing oil from the Northern fields to the Arabian Gulf and if necessary oil from the Southern fields to Haditha where it will be fed into pipelines across Syria and Lebanon. The main contractor for this project is Snam Progetti who are leading an Italian group of companies. The construction contract is worth ID 44.5 m. Contracts for supply of pipes worth ID 27m have been given to Sumitomo (Japan) and Pont a Mousson (France). Work is scheduled to start in spring of 1974 and completion is expected after 23 months.
- (b) I.N.O.C. Deep Sea Terminal. This project has been divided into off-shore and on-shore work. The American company Brown and Root have been awarded the contract for off-shore installations at a cost of ID 36 m. The contract covers laying of two 48" sea lines and erection of 4 berth terminal designed to receive tankers up to 350,000 dwt. The on-shore contract was awarded to Mannesman-Export A.G. of W. Germany at a cost of ID 55 m. Work will include a pumping station at Rumaila, pipeline with a capacity of 50m tons initially, increasing to 80m tons, and a loading station at Fao. A British company, Ingersoll Rand (UK) has contracted to supply gas turbines to the value of \$6 m for this pipeline.
- (c) Expansion of existing pipelines Kirkuk/East Mediterranean. The contract for this project, which involves increasing the capacity of existing pipelines from 57 m tons pa to 65 m tons pa, has been awarded to the French company Entrepose.

Major project not yet awarded is for building pipelines (oil and gas) from Iraq to Turkey. The oil pipeline will run from Kirkuk to Dörtol with an initial capacity of 25 m tons pa. The gas pipeline will run from Kirkuk to Batman in eastern Turkey and will possibly feed an ammonia plant and a power station.

Petrochemical Projects

Major project in this field is the Basra Petrochemical Project which was included in Iraq's National Development Plan 1970-74 and total cost is expected to be ID 35-40 m. Project will include Low and High Density Polyethylene plants and Chlorine Plant. A contract for expanding the existing Chemical Fertilizers Factory in Basra was awarded to Mitsubishi, who built the original plant.

Industrial Projects

The first stage of the Steel Mill at Khor Al Zubair (a melting plant and rolling mill) has been awarded to the French company Creusot Loire at a total cost of ID 40.5 m. Capacity of this mill is 400,000 tons pa.





Consideration is, we understand, being given to the building of a plant for production of finished and semi-finished aluminium products. This project is expected to cost about ID 40m.

The Polish foreign trade organisation Polimex-Cekop has been awarded a ID 30m contract for the supply of equipment to raise the production of clinker at the Fallujah cement plant by 400,000 tons a year.

#### Building Projects

There is a great deal of activity in the roads and bridges field including the building of a new bridge across the Tigris in Baghdad. Iraqi Ports Authority in Basra are at present tendering for a container wharf at Um Qasr and for the construction of a shipbuilding yard. Plans for a new 1000 bed military hospital are expected to be finalised shortly.

#### Telecommunications

A Japanese company was awarded a ID 6.5 m contract to carry out the National Microwave Project. This micro-wave link will extend from Mosul in the north to Basra in the south. A French company has contracted to provide equipment at a cost of ID 2m.

The contract for the Northern Coaxial Cable Project was awarded to N.E.C. (Japan) at a cost of just over ID 2m. Provisions for an Eastern Coaxial Cable Scheme connecting Baghdad with towns in Eastern Iraq and for the Euphrates Coaxial Cable Project, which will link Baghdad with Syria, is made in the recently announced five-year communications plan.

#### Agriculture and Irrigation

Iraq has secured two major IBRD loans in recent months for agricultural projects. \$40 m has been approved for the construction of Grain Silos and \$40 m for the Lower Khalis Irrigation Project. The consultants for the latter project are the British company Sir M. MacDonald and Partners. A British contractor, Marples Ridgway, has started work on an irrigation project at Dujaila near Kutworth about ID 2m.

A Greek contractor has recently been awarded \$140 m drainage and irrigation scheme south of Baghdad.

#### Communications

Iraqi Airways have purchased five Boeing aircraft, the first to be delivered this summer, at a total cost of ID 19m. The Iraqi Railways Administration, which normally purchases locomotives and rolling stock from East Europe, has recently been authorised to purchase 30 diesel engines from Canada at a cost of approx ID  $3\frac{3}{4}$  m.

#### Electricity

A Polish organisation has gained a contract for the expansion of power stations in four areas at a cost of ID 1.9m.





### INDIA/IRAQ AGREEMENT.

Under an agreement signed on 28 March 1974, Iraq will provide India with \$110 million credit for crude oil purchases. Amounting to 2.8m tonnes all for delivery in 1974. A further agreement on economic and technical cooperation was also signed which places the recently set up Joint Economic Commission on a permanent footing. The Commission will have responsibility for promoting and coordinating cooperation between the two countries in the fields of trade, agriculture, industry, culture, science and technology.

Plans are also in hand for alumina and pelletised iron ore plants to be set up in India with long term Iraq's credits, in return for shipment of their output to Iraq. In addition India will assist Iraq with major projects in irrigation and agriculture, and establish 3 technical institutes and polytechnics in Iraq.

### Iraq/Spain Agreement

Under an agreement signed on 22 March 1974 Spain is to participate in some 30 industrial and agricultural projects in Iraq. The agreement also provides for an increase in trade between the two countries and for the supply by Spain of agricultural and industrial machinery and equipment. In return Iraq will supply Spain with over 25m tons of crude oil up to the end of 1979 at current world prices.

### Iraq/Japan Agreement

Under an agreement signed in January 1974, Japan will provide Iraq with credits of US\$1,000 million for the implementation of oil and industrial projects. In return Iraq is to supply Japan with 90m tons of crude oil over the next 10 years. The quantity of oil to be supplied during the first year is believed to be around 5m tons but talks are reported to have broken down on the question of price. Further negotiations are expected to take place at the end of April.



CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON THE COMET MISSION TO IRAQ,  
23 - 25 February, 1974.

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A COMET Mission, designed to explore the possibilities for British industry and commerce in the light of Iraq's new financial situation, visited Baghdad from 23 to 25 February, 1974, inclusive. The members were Lord Denman (Leader), Sir Richard Beaumont (Director-General, Middle East Association), Mr. A. McLaren (Managing Director, CJB Limited), Sir John Palmer (Agricultural Consultant) and Mr. H.M. Thomson (Secretary).

The original proposal that a mission should be sent was conveyed in a letter dated 21 November, 1973, from COMET's Chairman to the Minister of Economy, sent through the British Interests Section in Baghdad. No written reply was ever sent, and verbal approval to the proposal was not given to the British Interests Section until the very end of January, after the date originally proposed. The programme (an outline of which is attached) sent to us by the BIS shortly before our departure from London, was arranged entirely by them, without assistance from either the Ministry of Economy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It included meetings with senior officials, but in only one or two cases the heads, of State Organisations, essential features of any such programme, and also to senior officials of the principal banks, the Federation of Iraqi Industries and the Federation of Iraqi Chambers of Commerce. It included no visits to Ministers. It was therefore clear from the start that the Mission was not to be received with any great empressement, and that a conspicuously medium level of contact was the best we could hope for. This was disappointing, but in present circumstances not in any way surprising. It was however in sharp contrast to the programme at a considerably



higher level arranged for the COMET Mission of 1969.

In the event, however, the meetings arranged for the Mission proved to be cordial and in some cases extremely useful. The Minister of Planning was reported to have said that not only he but all his senior subordinates would be too busy to see the Mission, but in the end a meeting was arranged with the Head of the Industrial Division of that Ministry, and a further appointment was made for Sir John Palmer to meet the Head of the Agricultural Division on the day after the Mission departed. In addition to this, the Minister of Economy decided to see the Mission himself at the close of the last day. It can be assumed therefore that the original decision to keep the Mission to some extent at arms length was modified during the course of the visit. It was hoped, on the social side, that the Mission's reception by the Minister might be followed by some important Iraqi representation at the final cocktail party given by Mr. McCluney. At both parties however Iraqi attendance was extremely small.

Clearly there was a limit to the amount of detailed information which could be obtained in the space of three days. The attached brief record of meetings contains references to nearly all the subjects which were touched upon, however lightly. But at this stage the details, which can be left to British companies who are prepared to explore the market, are of much less importance than the general picture which emerged during the three days.

Economically, though not politically, there is a new situation in Iraq, different in its potential from any which has ever existed before. Iraq has had development plans (some of which have been partially implemented) supported - from time to time - by funds earmarked from oil revenue ever since the country's income reached a sizable level in 1951. Though much work has been done in these 23 years, progress has never been anywhere near a satisfactory level, largely, though not entirely, because of the military expenditure which successive regimes from 1958 onwards have considered desirable.



Today, all the financial obstacles which have been partly responsible for the slow rate of progress in the past have been removed. Recent developments in the petroleum market, too well known to need detailed description here, have raised Iraq's present and prospective income to a level which gives the Government a free hand in the field of development. Apart from these developments in the market, there will be in the fairly near future a massive increase in production from the southern fields still partly in the hands of the original concessionaires. It is the expressed intention of the Government, conveyed to the Mission by a number of voices, most significantly by the Head of the Industrial Division of the Ministry of Planning and by the Minister of Economy, not to hoard or invest this increasing income but to spend it in the rapid development of the country's economy. At many meetings strong emphasis was placed on the necessity for maximum speed. There is no doubt that in the coming years much genuine enthusiasm and real administrative competence, especially in the Ministry of Planning, will be devoted to the development of the country. It is less certain that the administrative competence of the Ministry of Planning is matched by the capacity of the other Departments and State Organisations who will implement their plans.

On the question of speed, there has been a most welcome realisation in Government circles that in the past foreign companies operating in Iraq as contractors have suffered from serious administrative difficulties, in connexion with taxes, Labour relations, permits for personnel and material, etc, difficulties which have in no way helped the Government themselves. This realisation is reflected in Law 157 of 1973, ON IMPLEMENTATION OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. The intention of this Law is to remove some or all of these difficulties by enabling its newly created instrument, THE OIL AFFAIRS FOLLOW UP AND AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE, to take decisions which will remove the red tape wherever red tape is delaying the progress of the development plans. An illustration given in the Ministry



of Planning was that where there were income tax difficulties, for example, the Ministry of Planning would pay; where there were difficulties over severance arrangements at the end of a contract for local employees, the Ministry would settle the business; in such cases, of course, sending in the bill in due course. There was no question of relieving foreign companies of any taxes for which they might be liable, merely of lifting the burden of administrative difficulty from their shoulders. It would be foolishly optimistic to imagine that this Law will mean the end of all such difficulties, but the fact that the intention and the Law are there is a considerable step forward.

Also on the question of speed, it was made clear that the Government intends to shop around the world for its many requirements, regardless of political considerations. Great play was made with the fact that a large contract had recently been let to a U.S. company, and that more would certainly follow as proof of the Government's intentions in this connexion. Russia, China and Europe would all be candidates for participation in the great works to come. There was no indication whatsoever that there was any bias in Government circles against Britain as a trading partner; and at the managerial and user level, in all technical circles, it is well known that by training and familiarisation Iraqis are happier with British equipment than with any other. A number of officials expressed a hope that trade with Britain would expand.

Again in the interests of speed, the Government are removing virtually all barriers to the import of foreign personnel to be engaged on contract work, down to the artisan level. An example was quoted of a Greek contractor employing a considerable number of first class heavy drivers much more highly paid than their Iraqi counterparts. It was pointed out that, in addition to the speed at which they work, the presence and productivity of first class operators in any field can be turned to good advantage in the training of Iraqis.

The facts of Iraq's new financial situation



and prospects are of course well enough known in official and banking circles in London, and they may have been fully grasped by those British exporters who supplied £25 to £30 millions worth of goods to Iraq last year, and by those suppliers of services who are working there on the ground. It seems however unlikely that the significance of these financial facts has yet been grasped by British industry and commerce as a whole. Many British companies have in recent years been inhibited from paying much attention to Iraq by the bad press which that country has had in the U.K., by experience, in some cases, of actual working conditions in Iraq, which have seldom been ideal, and by frequent reports on the difficulties experienced by the Iraq Petroleum Company. The financial restrictions resulting from these latter difficulties have been in themselves a further inhibiting factor. It would therefore appear to be the task of the Mission to give some publicity in the right quarters to the significance of the new financial situation, and to the new attitudes of the Iraq Government towards foreign companies undertaking development contracts.

It is not considered that a published report, from which too much of significance would have to be omitted, would meet the present case. It is therefore intended a) that an article on the subject in the Financial Times should be inspired. (This is already in hand).

b) that a similar article in the Economist should be inspired, chiefly for the benefit of Ministers and officials in Baghdad, where the Economist is widely read.

c) that a meeting of selected members of the Middle East Association should be called to discuss the subject. (This is also in hand.)

d) that a similar meeting might be held in some other venue such as the London Chamber of Commerce.

e) that a confidential letter might be addressed by the Chairman of COMET to the Chairmen or Chief Executives of leading companies most likely to be interested in Iraq.

f) that the various members of the Mission should pass on the benefit of their recent experience to the trade associations, their colleagues and associates and competitors in their own fields of activity.



MISSION PROGRAMME  
23-25 February, 1974.

23 February:

1. Briefing at British Interests Section.
2. DG of Foreign Trade Relations, Ministry of Economy.
3. Head of Projects Dept., State Organisation for Industrial Design and Constructions.
4. President, State Organisation for Trade.
5. Secretary-General, Federation of Iraqi Chambers of Commerce.
6. President (see 3 above), State Organisation for Industrial Design and Constructions.
7. Cocktail party given by Commercial Secretary.

24 February:

1. President, State Organisation for Industrial Development.
2. Director of Planning, State Organisation for Soil and Land Reclamation.
3. President, State Organisation for Textile Industries.
4. GM, Commercial Bank of Iraq.
5. Dinner, Basra Petroleum Co. Ltd.

25 February:

1. Secretary-General, Federation of Iraqi Industries.
2. Counsellor, Central Bank.
3. President, State Organisation for Drugs.
4. Head of Industrial Division, Ministry of Planning.
5. Minister of Economy.
6. Cocktail Party, Head of British Interests Section.

Meetings were also arranged for some members of the Mission with the Under Secretary for Technical Affairs at the Ministry for Oil and Minerals, the Vice-President (Technical Affairs) of INOC, and the Head of the Agricultural Division of the Ministry of Planning.





## OIL

- 1 Oil production in Iraq has not risen as fast as in other major Middle East oil producing countries due mainly to the protracted disputes 1961-73 between the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and the Iraqi Government. Prior to the nationalisation of IPC in 1972 most of Iraq's crude was produced by IPC and its associated companies - Mosul Petroleum Co (MPC) and Basrah Petroleum Co (BPC). In March 73, in settlement, the IPC Group surrendered their claims to everything except the Basrah field in Southern Iraq which continues to be operated by BPC. Since October 1973 the Iraq National Oil Company has held a 38% share in BPC through the nationalisation of the Mobil, Exxon and Dutch Shell shares in the company. The balance is held by the French CFP (23.75%), British Petroleum (23.75%) and Shell UK (9.5%), each taking their corresponding share of the production of the company, which in 1972 produced 32.5m tons of Iraq's total production of 72m tons. Britain thus continues to have a considerable interest in Iraqi oil for the time being - by the end of 1976 however Iraq will own a larger proportion of the equity of BPC, on the Gulf participation formula alone.
- 2 The former IPC and MPC fields in the North are now operated by the Iraqi Company for Oil operation (ICOO) and this plus the production of the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) and the continuing operations of BPC constitute Iraq's total production.
- 3 Under the terms of the settlement of the IPC dispute, the BPC agreed to increase production from its fields in South Iraq from the 1972 level of 32.5m tons to 80m tons by 1976, involving, inter alia, expansion of the BPC deepwater terminal at Khor al-Amaya.
- 4 Including the BPC increase, Iraq plans to double its total oil production over the next four years. Current production is estimated to be running at the rate of 115m tons a year. Proven reserves are reported to be in the region of 4,000m tons (but this is almost certainly an understatement as exploration has been at a low level during the period of the IPC dispute and it is thought that the potential of Iraq could be second only to Saudi Arabia).
- 5 Apart from its share of the BPC production (and of the 15m tons of crude which Iraq is supplying free to IPC as part of the dispute settlement terms), Shell UK entered into an agreement in March 73 to buy 4m tons of crude in 1974 and 12m tons in 1975.
- 6 In July 73 a consortium of European oil majors Shell/CFP/Veba/ENI put forward a proposition that they (and possibly other oil companies) should undertake large scale oil exploration and development in Iraq with most of the oil being sold to the consortium at market prices and INOC repaying the cost of development over a period. In return Iraq would receive from the Consortium assistance on the development of major agricultural and industrial projects. The proposals would require the backing of the individual governments in guaranteeing the investment both in oil exploration and subsequent development. So far as Shell UK is concerned the proposition has IENG's benevolent approval (but no commitment) for discussions with the Iraqis to proceed - and they are continuing.





7 With the settlement of the IPC dispute, Iraq regained her access to her hard currency markets in the West and although reported to be generally reluctant to conclude any new barter deals with Eastern Bloc countries, wishing rather to sell for cash, has in fact entered into bilateral deals of various sorts with several countries including some Eastern Bloc. While at the height of the oil shortage she was able to sell substantial parcels of oil at high prices, she is now coming up against increasing buyer resistance on prices (eg the recent Iraq/Japan agreement - see Annex D).

8 It is difficult to forecast at this stage the extent to which Iraq will be able to absorb her increasing oil revenues (from increasing production and higher oil prices) in her economic development. On present indications it would appear likely that she will have some excess revenues at least over the next few years.

ONE 4

Department of Trade

April 1974





GDP No 43/73

## GENERAL DEPARTMENTAL POLICY NOTICE

IRAQ

## PART I

1. This notice restates the Department's terms and conditions of cover, but relaxes the consultation requirement in paragraph 3a substituting £2m for £ $\frac{1}{2}$ m
2. GDP No 25/68 is hereby cancelled.

## PART II

3. Authority for Cover: Cover is available subject, for business outside the short term field, to the following restrictions:

- a. Section 1. There is no monetary limit but all cases over £2m should be referred to EID.
- b. Section 2. There is no general authority and cover for any case not acceptable under Section 1 would have to be justified on special grounds of national interest. EID should be consulted on any application which needs to be put to the Treasury for Section 2 cover.

4. Country Grading: "C"

## COMPREHENSIVE GUARANTEE DIVISION: Terms and Special Conditions

5. Short Term Cover: Normal cover is available.
6. Extended Terms Cover: Cover is available subject to paragraph 3

## SPECIFIC GUARANTEE DIVISION: Terms and Special Conditions

7. Short term type cover: Normal cover is available.
8. Other Guarantees: Cover is available subject to paragraph 3.

## BUYER CREDIT DIVISIONS: Terms and Special Conditions

9. Buyer Credit Facilities  
Supplier Credit Facilities  
Lines of Credit  
Financial Guarantees
- } Cover is available subject to paragraph 3.

## OTHER CONDITIONS AND PROCEDURES

10. The Full Percentage Facility is available for this market.

R FELL

16 August 1973

OD 156

(Remains applicable as at April 1974)



## BRITISH TRADE WITH MIDDLE EAST

Unit: £1 Million

UK EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM	UK EXPORTS			UK IMPORTS		
	December	January-December		December	January-December	
	1973	1972	1973	1973	1972	1973
Algeria	3.2	33.8	37.9	3.9	22.9	45.7
Bahrain	1.4	19.6	24.3	0.3	8.6	15.8
Egypt	0.9	18.4	27.1	1.5	12.6	23.7
Iraq	1.5	26.8	27.1	7.4	34.1	30.7
Jordan	1.0	11.3	13.4	/	0.7	0.5
Kuwait	2.5	31.3	36.1	32.3	176.5	235.3
Lebanon	3.6	35.6	42.0	0.4	6.5	8.0
Libya	3.3	46.3	61.1	9.5	144.2	164.5
Morocco	1.5	13.3	16.2	2.9	16.1	23.1
Oman	1.9	17.2	22.2	6.3	2.9	15.9
Peoples Dem. Rep. of Yemen	0.4	4.3	4.5	0.1	1.8	3.4
Qatar	1.7	12.8	19.4	3.3	39.3	47.3
Saudi Arabia	4.4	45.2	58.5	42.7	183.7	322.2
Sudan	1.5	23.1	26.9	1.2	5.3	8.4
Syria	0.7	10.0	11.6	0.1	0.4	1.2
Tunisia	0.8	6.2	7.6	0.3	2.3	3.6
Abu Dhabi	1.8	15.3	24.7	6.1	42.5	33.5
Dubai & Northern Emirates (+)	1.6	15.8	24.7	1.8	11.3	35.7
Yemen Arab Rep.	0.2	3.0	3.2	/	/	0.4
<b>TOTAL (1)</b> <b>(Arab Countries)</b>	<b>33.9</b>	<b>389.3</b>	<b>488.5</b>	<b>120.1</b>	<b>711.7</b>	<b>1018.9</b>
Afghanistan	0.2	2.3	2.9	0.4	10.4	11.6
Ethiopia	0.7	5.6	7.0	0.4	2.2	3.6
Iran	19.0	117.0	169.4	10.1	123.8	237.4
<b>TOTAL (2)</b> <b>(Comet Countries)</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>514.2</b>	<b>667.8</b>	<b>131.0</b>	<b>848.1</b>	<b>1271.5</b>
Israel	10.5	134.6	187.2	5.3	57.2	69.9
Somalia	0.1	1.8	2.1	/	/	0.1
Turkey	7.5	60.1	81.8	2.0	16.9	33.9
<b>TOTAL (3)</b> <b>(Grand Total)</b>	<b>71.9</b>	<b>710.7</b>	<b>938.9</b>	<b>138.3</b>	<b>922.2</b>	<b>1375.4</b>

NOTES: (+) Sharjah; Ras-al-Khaimah; Umm Al Qaiwain; Fujairah  
 (/) Negligible

Source: Overseas Trade Accounts



ANNEX D

DISCUSSIONS ON THE SITUATION IN THE AREA (PARAGRAPH 3C OF STEERING BRIEF)

Arab/Israel

1. HMG's position is set out in the attached FCO telegrams Nos 175 and 207 to Cairo and relevant extract from the Secretary of State's speech in the House of Commons on 19 March.

Oman - British and Iranian Involvement

Line to Take - Defensive

2. British support for the Sultan is long-standing. He is the legitimate ruler of the whole of Oman. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that we should provide military assistance to help the Sultan put down a Communist inspired rebellion in one of his own provinces which derives its support from PDRY. We provide loan service personnel to serve with the governments of many friendly countries, of which Oman is one.

3. As for Iranian military assistance, Oman asked for help from a number of friendly States and would gladly have accepted Arab aid. As it was the Iranians responded quickly and generously. If there were no PDRY support for the rebellion, the Sultan would not have had to seek foreign military support. Iranian assistance is generally accepted in the Arab world as a straightforward measure of help to a friendly, neighbouring State.

The Gulf Islands

Line to Take - Defensive

4. The present position has been tacitly accepted by the Gulf States and the Arab world generally. The UAE exchanged Ambassadors with Iran at the start of 1973, indicating that they regarded the episode as closed. Relations between the two States are normal. The Gulf States regard it as in their interest to co-operate with Iran, with whom many of them have close links. Raising the matter again can do no good whatever.

/EXTRACTS



EXTRACT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S SPEECH IN THE  
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 19 MARCH

However we get on in this connection - and we shall do our best to make it succeed - I think that there is common agreement that the largest immediate threat to peace lies perhaps not in Europe but in the Middle East. By a fortunate coincidence, in the week before the election was called I was able to visit the Middle East and have conversations with both Mrs Meir and President Sadat.

My talks with President Sadat convinced me that there is a possibility of achieving a situation in the area perhaps short of absolute peace but giving the region an era of stability unknown in more than a generation. Despite what is happening at the moment, I still believe that to be true, because the will is present.

Likewise, my talks with Mrs Meir left me in no doubt that there is an overwhelming desire for a secure peace in her country, too. But we should be clear that it is Israel which runs the greater risks in the search for peace.

I wish to pay a sincere tribute to the herculean efforts of Dr Kissinger, whose tireless work has done so much to bring about the present situation of even modified optimism.

Our own policy is that we stand ready to play any role that would be constructive in peace-keeping or in the negotiations, but we do not wish to push ourselves forward. I discussed this with both leaders with whom I talked. There is no occasion for Britain to push herself forward unless there is a genuine desire on behalf of the main protagonists for our participation. Then we should consider it very seriously.

We believe that the earliest possible just and lasting solution will come through the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. Such a settlement will have to take account of the fundamental principles of that resolution - Israel's withdrawal and the right of every State in the area to live in peace and security. We also believe that there will be no permanent peace unless a settlement provides for a "personality" for the Palestinian people - a word which I choose deliberately for reasons which may not be immediately clear but I believe it to be the best word in the present circumstances.

The other problem resulting from the Middle East conflict - namely, the energy crisis - also needs urgent treatment. When Dr Kissinger came to London three months ago, the Prime Minister and I had the opportunity of talking to him, and we both welcomed his ideas for co-operation between energy producers and consumers, and we believe that the Washington Energy Conference was a useful and timely initiative.



The repercussions of the massive increase in oil prices has transformed the world in which British foreign policy operates. International trade and finance are not accustomed to accommodating the levels of money now available to the oil States. We desire the closest possible co-operation with the major producing and consuming countries on such matters as price and demand management and research programmes, and we shall follow up the prospects of effective international action on the economic and monetary impact of the new situation. Some of the ideas now being put about are very interesting and could transform our relations.

Our capacity to help the less developed countries will obviously be determined to a great extent by the pace of our economic recovery. But our manifesto clearly commits us to the United Nation targets, and we shall seek to achieve them in the years ahead.



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1974

TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO TEL NO 175 OF 12 MARCH/AND TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, KHARTOUM, TRIPOLI, RABAT, ALGIERS, TUNIS, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, SANAA, ADEN INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, EEC POSTS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 278 (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST.

1. I AM TOLD THAT THE ARABS ARE APPREHENSIVE THAT THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT MIGHT MEAN A CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST. YOU AND THE OTHER ADDRESSEES OF THIS TELEGRAM SHOULD SEEK AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED AT THE HIGHEST AVAILABLE LEVEL, ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.

2. THIS GOVERNMENT IS JUST AS COMMITTED AS THE LAST ONE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL ITS PARTS, AS REAFFIRMED IN RESOLUTION NO 338. WE RECOGNISE THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT WILL HAVE TO SATISFY THE ARABS DETERMINATION TO HAVE THEIR TERRITORY RESTORED, JUST AS IT WILL HAVE TO SATISFY THE ISRAELIS' NEED TO LIVE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES. IT WILL ALSO HAVE TO OFFER THE PALESTINIANS, A STAKE IN THE FUTURE. YOU SHOULD MAKE FULL USE OF MY ARTICLE IN "THE TIMES" ON 13 FEBRUARY IN WHICH I SAID THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR ISRAEL TO TAKE A CALCULATED RISK AND WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL BRING HER RECOGNITION WITHIN BORDERS THAT ARE AGREED AND ACCEPTED BY THE ARAB STATES AND WILL GIVE THE PALESTINIANS A SATISFACTORY PERSONALITY.

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/3. IF



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3. IF YOU ARE ASKED WHEN A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST CAN BE EXPECTED, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THERE WILL BE A REFERENCE (NECESSARILY BRIEF) TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE QUEEN'S SPEECH AND POSSIBLY ALSO IN THE DEBATE ON THAT SPEECH. YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE MORROW OF TAKING OFFICE WITHOUT HAVING HAD TIME TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE YEARS SINCE A LABOUR GOVERNMENT WAS LAST IN OFFICE. THIS DOES NOT INDICATE ANY HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE ARABS OR ANY DEPARTURE FROM RESOLUTION 242 IN THE DRAFTING OF WHICH A PREVIOUS LABOUR ADMINISTRATION PLAYED A LEADING AND DECISIVE PART. WE HAVE EVERY INTENTION OF ESTABLISHING CLOSE CONTACT AND UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. IN APPROPRIATE POST, YOU SHOULD ADD THAT I AM PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING CONTACTS BETWEEN BRITISH AND ARAB TRADE UNIONS.

**WITHDRAWAL.**

4. IF YOU ARE QUESTIONED ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT RECOGNISE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF TERRITORIAL AGGRANDISEMENT THROUGH WAR AND PLACE AS MUCH IMPORTANCE ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS ON THE RIGHT OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE.

**THE HARROGATE SPEECH.**

5. IF ASKED WHETHER WE ADHERE TO THE HARROGATE SPEECH OF OCTOBER 1970, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT YOU WOULD HARDLY EXPECT A LABOUR FOREIGN SECRETARY TO ADOPT WORD FOR WORD A SPEECH MADE BY A CONSERVATIVE FOREIGN SECRETARY. IN ANY CASE THAT SPEECH WAS AN ATTEMPT TO LAY DOWN A FAIRLY SPECIFIC INTERPRETATION OF HOW RESOLUTION 242 MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED. WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT RESOLUTION 242 WHOLEHEARTEDLY, AS WELL AS ITS MOST RECENT REAFFIRMATION IN RESOLUTION 338. BUT NOW THAT, AT LONG LAST, THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESSES HAVE BEGUN AND THE VARIOUS PARTIES ARE IN ACTIVE CONTACT WITH ONE ANOTHER IT WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO MAKE FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT IF AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES THEMSELVES THAN IF WE AS A THIRD PARTY CUT ACROSS THOSE EFFORTS BY SUGGESTING SPECIFIC AND DETAILED SOLUTIONS OF OUR OWN.

**/THE EUROPEAN DECLARATION**



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THE EUROPEAN DECLARATION.

6. IF ASKED ABOUT THE EUROPEAN DECLARATION OF 6 NOVEMBER 1973, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE DECLARATION IS ON THE RECORD. IT WAS PRESENTED AS A FIRST CONTRIBUTION TO THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION. WE ARE SURE IT HAS BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE NOW ON THE REQUIREMENTS POSED BY THE STAGE WHICH THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION HAS NOW REACHED

ARMS SALES.

7. IF ASKED ABOUT THE POLICY OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TOWARDS ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE SHALL LOOK VERY CAREFULLY AT EACH PROPOSAL ON ITS MERITS IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS.

THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE.

8. IF ASKED WHAT OUR ATTITUDE WILL BE TO THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE MANY ASPECTS OF OUR EUROPEAN POLICY WHICH I AM STUDYING.

CALLAGHAN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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(NF)

FM FCO 261615Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO TELNO 207 OF 26 MARCH, 1974 AND TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN DOHA ABU DHABI DUBAI MUSCAT PRIORITY TRIPOLI RABAT ALGIERS TUNIS SANA'A ADEN INFO IMMEDIATE EEC POSTS TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PRIORITY MOSCOW OTTAWA AND SAVING FOR INFO TO TOKYO.

MY TELNO 175, PARAGRAPH 6: THE EUROPEAN DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION I HAVE DECIDED THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE EUROPEAN DECLARATION OF 6 NOVEMBER LAST TO WHICH I HAVE ANY OBJECTION. NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE BRIEFING THE PRESS ACCORDINGLY THIS AFTERNOON. THEY WILL BE SAYING ON THE RECORD THAT QUOTE THE EUROPEAN DECLARATION IS ESSENTIALLY A RE-STATEMENT OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN A PEACE AGREEMENT AS SET OUT IN THE BASIC RESOLUTION 242 AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE PROVISIONS OF THAT RESOLUTION. WE DO NOT THEREFORE DISSENT FROM THE DECLARATION UNQUOTE.
2. YOU SHOULD MAKE FULL USE OF THIS STATEMENT.

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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## CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT SIR DONALD MAITLAND MAY WISH TO RAISE  
(PARAGRAPH 3D OF THE STEERING BRIEF)

Indian Staff of the Interest Section

1. A dispute has recently arisen with the Iraq Protocol Department over the employment of 3 Indian locally-engaged employees at the Interests Section. The Iraq authorities have refused an exit and re-entry visa to one of them who wished to take his leave in India. The Director of Protocol has informed Mr McCluney that they will not renew the visas of any of the Indian employees, that they would prefer them to leave quietly without fuss, that the matter was trivial and that they did not wish it to affect progress towards diplomatic relations.
2. Under Article 7 of the Vienna Convention (which Iraq ratified on 15 October 1963) the sending State may freely appoint members of the mission subject inter alia to the following provisions:-
  - (i) that the receiving state may reserve the right to withdraw their consent to the appointment of nationals of a third State who are not also nationals of the sending state (Article 8)
  - (ii) that the receiving State may without explanation declare a diplomat persona non grata or any other member of the staff not acceptable. (Article 9). (This point has been raised in argument by the Iraqis.)



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3. However, Article 47(1) provides that in applying the Convention the receiving State must not discriminate as between States. In other words, the Iraqis can only rely on Article 8 if they have applied the same policy to all other missions employing nationals of third States. If they have not done so then they can only rely on Article 9 and should make it plain that what they are doing is declaring the three persons concerned not acceptable. Unless they do so they would have no justification for refusing to renew the visas. If they are declared not acceptable we could then decide whether or not to take reciprocal action.

Line to Take

4. The Iraqis might be persuaded to alter their decision by reasoning backed up with the above legal arguments. If negotiations are going well and the atmosphere generally suitable it might be possible to raise this question. It could be pointed out that the loss of these 3 very efficient and long-serving members of staff would impair the efficiency of the mission at a time when we were hoping to increase the size of the mission rather than to reduce it. The Indian staff have been charged with no misconduct and we could see no reason why they should be refused re-entry without explanation.

Mr Robert Ellis

5. Mr Ellis, a 74-year old British resident in Iraq was detained on 19 November 1973 by Iraqi security policy "for necessary



## ANNEX F

SUBJECTS THE IRAQIS MAY RAISE WITH SIR DONALD MAITLAND  
(PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE STEERING BRIEF)

1. Visas. As a result of an attempt by the Iraqi Public Relations Bureau (the arm of the Ba'ath Government concerned with terrorism and assassination) on the life of the former Iraqi Minister, General Abdul Razzaq al Naif in London in February 1972, Ministers decided that all applications for UK visas by Iraqi passport holders should be referred to London. Iraqi support of the PFLP and other terrorist organisations have made it impossible for this system to be abolished. Throughout the intervening period, we have had to refuse many applications from members of the PRB. The Iraqis have doubtless suffered some inconvenience and last week implemented a similar process in retaliation possibly in order to pressure us into revising our attitude. The subject will almost certainly be raised in Baghdad.

### LINE TO TAKE

2. We regret the delays in granting visas (applications take between 10 and 12 days to be processed) and any personal inconvenience caused to senior Iraqis. However, since the incident of 1972, Ministers have felt it necessary to impose the system of reference to London though we wish to emphasise that the decision was not politically motivated but taken on purely security grounds. Following international practice, we are not bound to give reasons for refusals of visas or for any visa system we employ. We do try to ensure that the system is applied as efficiently and speedily as possible and various measures have been taken which I hope will improve matters. It may be of little consolation but we apply a similar system with a number of other countries. [Applications from South Yemenis, Libyans and Palestinians are treated in the same way]. I shall of course take note of the Iraqi views and any suggestions you may make to improve the situation for consideration by the appropriate authorities in London.

### DEFENCE SALES - DEFENSIVE

3. The new administration is still considering its policy on defence sales. We do not discuss details of defence sales to third parties with other governments.

### MILITARY TRAINING FOR IRAQIS IN THE UK

4. There are basically three types of military training for Iraqis undertaken in the UK: intelligence, infantry and armed vehicle courses. Iraq had 9 places on courses in 1973 and have 4 this year.

/5. The ...



5. The Iraqis have not been regularly assisted financially with military training by the FCO and in our present economic climate and the Iraqis' relative affluence, there is little need for us to find money for this purpose.

LINE TO TAKE

6. We shall continue to accommodate Iraqi requests for military training where possible. Courses are, as the Iraqis will appreciate, heavily over-subscribed.



## BACKGROUND

## IRAQ

Internal

1. The Ba'ath Government in Iraq has been in power for nearly six years. Although there are regular rumours that the régime might split internally it appears to be firmly in control with final power in the hands of President Bakr and particularly Saddam Hussain.
2. Currently Iraq's major domestic problem is the Kurdish demand for autonomy in the North. Negotiations on this broke down before the 11 March 1974 deadline agreed in 1970. On that date the Iraq Government issued a decree granting the Kurds autonomy with the Republic of Iraq but on terms unacceptable to the Kurds. There have been unconfirmed reports of renewed fighting in the North. The resumption of full scale hostilities could deflect the Government's attention from their primary aim of implementing rapidly a vast development programme.
3. Iraq has unproven oil reserves which are estimated to be second only to those of Saudi Arabia. Current oil production is now increasing (1973 2.1 million barrels a day) after the setbacks following the nationalisation of IPC. As a result, Iraq can look forward to greatly increased oil revenues which could quadruple her estimated foreign exchange earnings in 1974 (1973 ID 400 million, 1974 ID 1.600 million). The Government's intention is that these new resources should be devoted to an intensified programme for the rapid development of the country's industrial and agricultural potential. British exports to Iraq in 1973 were worth £30 million.

27.1

External

4. Iraq, by her past maverick behaviour, has become largely isolated politically from the rest of the Arab world and has poor or barely satisfactory relations with all her neighbours. The Soviet Union, with whom Iraq signed a Treaty of Co-operation and Friendship in April 1972, is her major ally and supplier of defence equipment. The relationship with the Soviet Union is not, however, without its difficulties, as recent disagreements over the conduct of the Arab/Israel war and the prices the Russians pay for Iraqi oil have shown. Iraq's growing economic strength should enable her to resist more effectively any unwelcome Soviet pressures. France is her only Western friend although Iraq resumed relations with West Germany on 28 February. Relations with the US have been broken since 1969.



## IRAN/IRAQ

5. In spite of the recent resumption, relations between the two countries are unlikely to improve rapidly. In addition to the uneasy land border situation (the subject of a recent Security Council debate) there is a long-standing dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. Ba'athist Iraq sees the growth in military potential of Imperial Iran, and Iranian involvement in Oman, as a bid for hegemony in the area. In return, the Shah sees Iraq as a vital element in what he regards as the Soviet encirclement policy as well as a base for Iranian dissident activities.



FM F C O 051640Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 59 OF 5 APRIL 1974.

- YOUR TELS NOS 103 AND 105/7 : UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.



1. DELEGATION. THE OFFICIALS ACCOMPANYING SIR DONALD MAITLAND WILL BE GRAHAM BURTON OF MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT AND STANLEY GARDINER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE.
2. COMMUNIQUE. THE TEXT PROPOSED BY THE IRAQIS IS ACCEPTABLE ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD PREFER TO SEE OMITTED THE WORD "TEMPORARILY" FROM THE LAST LINE. NO OTHER ACTION EXCEPT THE JOINT PUBLICATION OF THE COMMUNIQUE NEED BE TAKEN TO ESTABLISH A RESUMPTION (PARA 1(B) OF YOUR TEL NO 103). YOU WILL AUTOMATICALLY BECOME CHARGE D D'AFFAIRES.
3. PROGRAMME. WE AGREE THE ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT IN YOUR TEL NO 103. YOU SHOULD, HOWEVER, ALLOW TIME FOR A COURTESY CALL TO BE PAID ON THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR BEFORE DISCUSSIONS AT THE MFA. SIR D MAITLAND WILL ALSO WISH TO PAY A CALL ON THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, PREFERABLY FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSIONS AND BEFORE LUNCH ON THE SAME MORNING. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, WE ENVISAGE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A RESUMPTION TAKING A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME AND WOULD NOT WISH TO BE DRAWN INTO DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF HMG'S POLICY IN THE SURROUNDING AREA. THE DELEGATION WILL BE HAPPY TO FALL IN WITH ANY SUGGESTIONS THE IRAQIS MAY HAVE FOR THE AFTERNOON OF THE 10TH. IF A CALL ON A "HIGHER AUTHORITY" IS ARRANGED, EARLY IN THE MORNING OF 11 APRIL WOULD SEEM SUITABLE.
4. SUBJECTS SIR D MAITLAND MAY WISH TO RAISE. WE ARE STILL CONSIDERING THIS MATTER. SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION WITH YOU ON ARRIVAL, SIR DONALD MAY WISH TO RAISE THE PROBLEM OF THE EXPULSION OF THE INDIAN STAFF AND POSSIBLY ELLIS.

/ 5. SECURITY.



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5. SECURITY. BURTON WILL BE CARRYING A CONFIDENTIAL BAG WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE PLACED IN THE CHANCERY OVERNIGHT.

6. PUBLICITY. IF ASKED ABOUT THE PURPOSES OF SIR D MAITLAND'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD, NEWS DEPARTMENT PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT HE IS VISITING BAGHDAD FOR DISCUSSIONS ON A POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE MFA OF THIS PROPOSED LINE.

CALLAGHAN

**FILES:**

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PS/MR. ENNALS  
MR. CAMPBELL  
MR. WEIR

- 2 -

**CONFIDENTIAL**



Brief provided by Brit Interests Section.  
 for Sir Ronald Maitland on his visit to Baghdad  
 for talks regarding resumption of relations between Iraq and UK.  
 NBR 25/578/1

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Since mid 1972, following the assassination attempt in UK on the life of the former Iraq Prime Minister and the general tightening up on the movements of nationals of Arab countries, almost all applications for visas have had to be referred to FCO.

2. Applications and photographs (which are an important part of the screening procedure) are sent twice (in the summer thrice) weekly by bag and clearance received by immediate telegrams 10-14 days later.

3. This delay is a major source of irritation to the MFA, Iraqi officials and businessmen. We are being constantly asked to cut corners for official, trade, humanitarian and personal reasons. Similar requests were made up to Ministerial level to the COMET delegation in February.

4. There have been a number of cases over which the MFA have been particularly irritated. One concerned a courier, who was held up for about 3 weeks over whom they threatened reciprocity and we are now receiving representations about a clerk joining the Cultural Attaches office in London, who applied on 27.2.74.

5. We have now delegation to issue visas without reference to

- (a) applicants who have been cleared by FCO during the last six months (very recent relaxation)
- (b) their wives
- (c) applicants over the age of 55 (except government officials) and children
- (d) women travelling alone (unless young or connected with government) or with children
- (e) really urgent medical cases (but not to their male escorts)

We stick fairly closely to the above categories but in other urgent cases (e.g. Ministers, major contracts, training courses) we issue after about 48 hours after informing M & V Dept that we intend to do so.

6. Visa applications received have been as follows

<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u> (travel restricted)	<u>1973</u>
9285	3972	9193

Applications for the first three months of 1974 show a 50% increase over the same period in 1973 (1345 against 884). There have been objections to about 30 applicants so far this year.

7. Although no statistics are available, our impression is that the biggest increase is in government and official travel. There is plenty of money available for official overseas trade and many Iraqis claim (we think genuinely) they would rather do business with Britain. MED has prepared a submission on the conflict between security and our commercial interests in Iraq.

8. In an effort to reduce friction, we have recently written to travel agents, airlines, chambers of commerce, the medical society,

/universities



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universities etc explaining the basic procedure and asking people to apply in plenty of time. We are also introducing a revised easier-to-complete application form and internal streamlined procedures.

9. Until recently, Iraq missions overseas appear to have been able to issue visas for tourists (other than groups) and businessmen without reference to Baghdad or ministries and state organisations have been able to authorise their issue on arrival. We understand now that all applications have to be referred to Baghdad for approval. This move does not appear to be anti-British as all western countries are affected.

7 April 1974

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INDIAN MEMBERS OF BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION

MR K R BOSE  
MR S R BOSE  
MR R P PADIYATH

NBR 25/548/1  
Brief provided for S.P. Matland  
by Brit Interests Section on his visit to Baghdad for  
talks on resumption of  
relations between Iraq and U.K.

1. The MFA informed us by note on 27 January that the Iraq authorities would not extend the work permits for our three Indian members of the staff. We pointed out that Article 9 (1) of Regulation No. 30 (Labour Law) excludes "Those employed by international bodies and foreign diplomatic missions and commercial consulates accredited to Iraq" from the requirement to have work permits, but on 24 March were asked orally by the Director of the Diplomatic Section (Miss Salima Bakr) to arrange for them to leave quietly, it being made clear that they would otherwise be declared not acceptable under Article 9 of the Vienna Convention.
2. Miss Bakr stated that we were free to engage other Indian nationals.
3. No formal reply has been made to MFA pending instructions from FCO.

Background

4. Mr K R Bose is our LE I Accountant. He joined the Embassy in 1942 following service in India and was established in 1955. He is married with two daughters and a son.
5. Mr R P Padiyath LE II is the senior locally engaged staff member in the Consulate. He joined the Consulate in Basrah in 1966 having previously served in the Indian Consulate there. He was transferred to Baghdad in 1972. He is married with two children. He wants to go on leave to India but has been advised not to go until his future is settled.
6. Mr S R Bose LE III works in the Consulate. He joined the Embassy in 1959 from outside employment. He is married with three daughters. Mr K R Bose is his brother.
7. Mr Padiyath and Mr S R Bose spend most of their time on visa processing, which is a major cause of irritation to Iraqi officials and businessmen. (see separate brief).
8. All three have identity cards issued by the MFA in lieu of residence permits. Work permits were issued for them in 1971 valid for one year. There has been correspondence with the Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs and the MFA since 1972 for their renewal.
9. There has been a general clampdown on foreign nationals who have been in Iraq for some years. This has applied in particular to the Indian community at Basra, many of whom are small traders.
10. We would find it very difficult to replace them (and their experience).

7 April 1974



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MR ROBERT ELLIS - Aged 74

*NBR 25/548/1  
by Brit Int. Sec. on his visit to Baghdad for talks on  
resumption of relations between Iraq & U.K.*

Mr Ellis was taken into custody by the Iraqi Security on 19 November 1973.

2. Since then repeated attempts have been made to gain consular access to him, by note, by visits to the Director General of Consular Affairs (Taqfik Abdul Jabbar), by the Swedish Ambassador who saw Under Secretary Shadhill Jassim Taqa on 14 January, and by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who gave the Iraqi Ambassador in Stockholm a memorandum on 31 January. The last note was sent to MFA on 2 April 1974.

3. The MFA officials accept that we have right of access to Mr Ellis under Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, but say that the security authorities will not allow it.

#### BACKGROUND

Mr Ellis is a retired civil engineer who has lived in Iraq since the 1920s. He is the local representative of Mobil Oil whose interests in Iraq were nationalised in 1973. He lives alone in the Alwiyah Club in Baghdad. He was forced to leave Iraq in 1967 but later allowed to return.

We understand that about 150 Iraqi citizens were detained with Mr Ellis and most are still held. One report was that their names were on an old list of free masons (proscribed in Iraq in 1958) in a bank safe deposit belonging to Major Claude C Chadwick who did not return from leave in 1958 and died in UK in 1971.

Mr Ellis has been allowed to telephone a friend Mr R Smyth from time to time to ask for clothes etc. There was a rumour on 17 March that Mr Ellis has been released but on 24 March he telephoned Mr Smyth saying he expected to be out in two or three days time.

He telephoned again on 3 April and told Mrs Smyth he had been over optimistic about his release. He then obliquely suggested that the Basrah Petroleum Company (BPC) make a move on his behalf. Mr Pawson (BPC), Mr Smyth and Mr McCluney have discussed this - Mr Pawson agreed to mention the matter (again) to Sd Chelabi (Under Secretary Ministry of Oil) and Mr McCluney promised to keep up consular pressure and discuss with Sir Donald Maitland.

6 April 1974



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FM BAGHDAD 070640Z APR.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

76

DESKBY FIRST THING MONDAY MORNING.

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 112 OF 7 APRIL 1974.

YOUR TEL NO 059. UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 -8 APR 1974 NBR 25/98/1
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25/8/4

1. I SAW TAQA SATURDAY MORNING.

2. COMMUNIQUE. I SAID WE FOUND THE TEXT (MY TEL 107) ACCEPTABLE. TAQA SAID THAT IN ENGLISH THEY PREFERRED "IN VIEW OF" TO "IN ACCORDANCE WITH" (PARA 1) AND "TALKS" TO "DISCUSSIONS" (PARA 2). THIS SEEMED UNIMPORTANT AND I SAID WE COULD ACCEPT THE RESULTING TEXT (IN MIFT).

3. DATE OF RESUMPTION. IT BECAME EVIDENT IN DOVETAILING THE PROGRAMME THAT THE RESUMPTION WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE ON 10 APRIL IF WE ARE TO CELEBRATE THAT EVENING. SD TAQA FIRMLY OFFERED A PRIVATE LUNCH AND SAID IF THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE IN THE AFTERNOON THEN I COULD GIVE A COCKTAIL PARTY AT THE EMBASSY IN THE EVENING (WE ARE CONSIDERING HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE.).

4. PROGRAMME. SEE MY TEL NO 114. SWEDISH AMBASSADOR WILL PROBABLY BE PRESENT AT AIRPORT ON ARRIVAL BUT I WILL ARRANGE CALL ON HIM 09.00 AM 10 APRIL. FRENCHMAN CERLE IS ON LEAVE. WOULD SIR D. MAITLAND WISH TO SEE CHARGE SAILLARD (COUNSELLAR) ?

5. PUBLICITY. SD TAQA AGREES THE LINE.

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PS TO MR ENNALS

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

MR TEBBIT

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FM BAGHDAD 070705Z APR.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FIRST THING MONDAY MORNING.

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 113 OF 7 APRIL 1974.

YOUR TEL NO 059 UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE AGREED IN BAGHDAD FOR  
PUBLICATION 18.00 HRS BAGHDAD (1500 GMT) 10 APRIL.

BEGINS.

"IN VIEW OF THE COMMON DESIRE OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF IRAQ AND BRITAIN TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS  
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE  
ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THEM, A  
DELEGATION REPRESENTING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND  
HEADED BY SIR DONALD MAITLAND [UNDER SECRETARY AT THE  
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE] VISITED THE REPUBLIC  
OF IRAQ FROM 9 APRIL TO 11 APRIL.


AS A RESULT OF THE TALKS CONDUCTED BY THE BRITISH  
DELEGATION WITH THE COMPETENT IRAQI AUTHORITIES, THE  
TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREED TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS  
AT AMBASSADOR LEVEL WITH EFFECT FROM 10 APRIL AND TO  
CONSOLIDATE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN  
THE TWO COUNTRIES.

UNTIL AMBASSADORS ARE APPOINTED, THE HEADS OF THE  
INTERESTS SECTIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL ACT AS  
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THEIR EMBASSIES".

ENDS.

/2. BBC AT

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2. BBC AT 1500GMT 10 APRIL HAVE RADIO NEWSREEL AND I HOPE MENTION OF RESUMPTION CAN BE INCORPORATED THEN (BUT NOT EARLIER) TO MEET IRAQI WISHES.

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P/S TO MR ENNALS  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR  
MR TEBBIT



CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 070715Z APR.

R E S T R I C T E D

DESKBY FIRST THING MONDAY MORNING.

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 114 OF 7 APRIL 1974.  
UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.



1. DRAFT PROGHAMME FOR SIR D. MAITLANDS VISIT.  
(# SIGNIFYS MFA AGREEMENT 6 APRIL).

MSB 8/4  
ja

TUESDAY  
9 APRIL

- # 21.10 PARTY ARRIVE BY IA 034. MET BY SHADHIL TAQA AND OUR STAFF.
- # 22.00 SIR DONALD MAITLAND, MR. GARDINER AND MR. BURTON TO BAGHDAD HOTEL.

WEDNESDAY  
10 APRIL

- 09.00 CALL ON H.E. OTTO RATHSMAN, AMBASSADOR OF SWEDEN.
- 10.00 BRIEFING MEETING - BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION.
- # 11.00 CALL AT MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SD. SHADHIL TAQA - UNDER SECRETARY.
- ?13.00 CALL ON "HIGHER AUTHORITY"
- # 14.00 LUNCH WITH SD. SHADHIL TAQA.
- (?17.30 CALL ON M. YVES SAILLARD, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF FRANCE).
- # 18.00 ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS (BBC AND LOCAL).
- 19.00 FLAG RAISING AT BRITISH EMBASSY - MEET STAFF AND WIVES.
- # 19.30-
- 21.00 RECEPTION - BRITISH EMBASSY.
- (?21.15 TWO SMALL DINNERS - SIR DONALD WITH ME, MR GARDINER WITH MR. DONOVAN.

/THURSDAY 11 APRIL



RESTRICTED

THURSDAY

11 APRIL

A.M. FREE AT PRESENT.

11.00 LEAVE FOR AIRPORT.

12.05 DELEGATION LEAVE BY FLIGHT BA 771 FOR LONDON.

2. GRATEFUL TO KNOW MONDAY IF YOU WISH ENGAGEMENTS  
17.30 AND 21.15 10 APRIL INCLUDED.

MCCLUNEY

# FILES

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MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR  
MR TEBBIT

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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
-8 APR 1974  
(NO 25/548/1)

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FM FCO 081015Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 61 OF 8 APRIL 1974

YOUR TELNO 114.

WE AGREE ON THE ARRANGEMENTS.

2. YOUR PARAGRAPH 2. YES.

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ja

CALLAGHAN

FILES  
MED  
MR WEIR



CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 62 OF 8 APRIL 1974

YOUR TEL 113: COMMUNIQUE

WE CAN AGREE REVISED DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE DESCRIPTION OF SIR DONALD MAITLAND IN PARAGRAPH 1, WHICH IS INCORRECT. WE REGRET OUR FAILURE TO SPOT THIS BEFORE. SIR DONALD IS NOT AT PRESENT AN UNDER SECRETARY IN THE FCO.

2. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD ARRANGE WITH THE IRAQIS TO AMEND THE RELEVANT PHRASE IN PARA 1 TO READ QUOTE A DELEGATION, HEADED BY SIR DONALD MAITLAND, REPRESENTING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, VISITED..... UNQUOTE.

3. YOUR PARAGRAPH 2. WE ARE ARRANGING FOR THE BBC ARABIC AND WORLD SERVICES TO CARRY THE ANNOUNCEMENT AT 1500 GMT.

CALLAGHAN


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MR WEIR

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CONFIDENTIAL



GRS 200

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CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 080940Z APR.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081130Z APR.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 116 OF 8 APRIL 1974.

MY TEL NO 114 OF 7 APRIL. UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

DRAFT PROGRAMME.

1. DUE TO VISIT OF BULGARIAN DELEGATION WITH WHOM  
SHADHIL TAOA WISHES TO HAVE TALKS AT 10 A.M. 10 APRIL,  
IRAQI SIDE HAVE ASKED FOR REVISIONS TO OUR PROGRAMME.

2. REDRAFT AS FOLLOWS :

WEDNESDAY 10 APRIL.

08.30 MEETING WITH SHADHIL TAOA AT MFA.

TO (SIR D. MAITLAND, MR. GARDINER, MR. BURTON, MR. MCCLUNEY9

09.30 MR. DONOVAN.

/AFTER

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

AFTER

10.00AM SIR D. MAITLAND MAY BE INVITED TO VISIT MUSEUM.  
MR. GARDINER AND MR. DONOVAN MAY MEET ECONOMIC  
CONTACTS.

13.00 CALL ON "HIGHER AUTHORITY" (THOUGH THIS MAY BE  
TRANSFERRED TO MORNING 11 APRIL AS WE ORIGINALLY  
SUGGESTED).

14.00 LUNCH WITH SHADHIL TAQA FOLLOWED BY TALKS.

17.30 FLAG RAISING CEREMONY - BRITISH EMBASSY.  
(IRAQIS WISH THIS TO PRECEDE ANNOUNCEMENT).

18.00 ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESUMPTION.

19.30 RECEPTION - BRITISH EMBASSY  
TO

21.00 (THIS WILL HAVE TO BE HELD IN THE GROUNDS  
-DRESS LOUNGE SUIT (NOT LIGHTWEIGHT).

3. SORRY ABOUT THE CHANGES - IRAQIS OPERATE IN A FAIRLY  
FLEXIBLE WAY ON THESE OCCASIONS.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

MED	GIPD
PCD	PS
SECURITY D	PS/MR ENNALS
POD	PS/PUS
COD	MR CAMPBELL
IAD	MR WEIR
NENAD	MR TEBBIT
NEWS D	





PART 'A' CLOSED

NOW SEE PART 'B'.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, ENGLAND



Trade And Economic Reports; COMET Mission; Position Of Indian Members Of British Consulate Staff; Position Of Mr. Ellis, Arrested In Baghdad. Resumption Of Diplomatic Relations Between Iraq And UK. 2 Jan. 1974. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2328. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107473331/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=3877074e&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107473331/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=3877074e&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.